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Abstract 
In September 2005 the South African Constitutional Court handed down the seminal 
judgment of Minister of Health v New Clicks. The judgment is critical to our 
understanding of administrative justice in South Africa not only with regard to the 
applicability of administrative justice principles to the making of subordinate legislation, 
or administrative rule making, but also because of its wide ranging analysis of the state 
of administrative law in South Africa. Although the final Constitution of 1996 included a 
justiciable right to administrative justice, it was only with the passing of the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act [PAJA] in 2000 that this right was given effect to. The 
legislation was expected to both codify South Africa’s common law and to introduce a 
system of administrative justice that was not wholly reliant on judicial review as a means 
of ensuring open, transparent and accountable government. The New Clicks judgment 
can be criticised for its lack of a truly majority judgment and the opaqueness of the 
justice achieved but it is to be welcomed for its certainty as regards the inter-relationship 
between the common law, the Constitution and PAJA. The judgment is concerned 
primarily with administrative rule-making but the case is analysed in this discussion with 
a view to extracting those principles that can be applied to administrative grievance 
tribunals. The practice of empowering expert tribunals to address grievances within the 
definition of administrative action and allowing administrators to review their own actions 
prior to a judicial review process is a favoured feature of administrative justice. The 
financial services industry is used as an example of the need for legislative consistency in 
the creation of such tribunals as well as a consistent standard of review of the resultant 
determinations, without which the advantages of tribunals as a means of achieving 
administrative justice are outweighed by competing jurisdictions, unnecessary costs and 
inefficiencies and, most significantly, the lack of justice for consumers. 
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1. Introduction   
Prior to the dramatic political changes which culminated in the 1994 Interim 
Constitution1, administrative law was one of the few tools available to individuals and 
groups attempting to enforce the rules of natural justice in their interactions with the 
state. The common law rules of natural justice, including the right to a hearing and the 
rule against bias, provided some small measure of procedural protection against 
capricious and arbitrary action by a state which founded its power in the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty. Section 24 introduced, for the first time in South Africa, a 
justiciable right to administrative justice and, ever mindful of the need to balance this 
right with the need for an efficient and effective administration, the drafters created a 
hierarchy the section that distinguished between rights, entitlements and expectations. 
Section 24 also confirmed that South Africa’s democracy was not going to be one based 
on a citizen’s right to just administrative action only when deprived of a pre-existing 
right. The final Constitution2, however, did not adopt a similar administrative justice 
clause, electing instead a broad right against anyone, public or private, exercising public 
power, but subject to the ever present need for efficiency in government. The right was 
however subject to the promulgation of national legislation. 
The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act3, it was hoped, would provide certainty 
as to the standard of review of administrative action as well as provide a framework of 
structures to augment judicial review as a means of managing the exercise of public 
power. It was also hoped that the legislation would normalise administrative law after 
the apartheid years when the judiciary alternatively submitted itself to the abuse of 
1 Act 200 of 1993 
2 Act 108 of 1996 
3 Act 3 of 2000  
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powers by the executive branch or government or stretched the useful boundaries of 
administrative review for the purpose of achieving some small amount of justice. As will 
be seen from the discussion in chapter 2.1 below, PAJA is criticised for not having lived 
up to all expectations. 
Two seminal cases have been heard before the Constitutional Court after the 
promulgation of PAJA; Bato Star4 and New Clicks5. Both cases have contributed to our 
understanding of administrative justice particularly with regard to the applicability of a 
standard of review of administrative action. A reasonableness standard, confirmed by 
PAJA, Bato Star and New Clicks, is the standard to which administrators are held. The 
standard is noteworthy for its recognition that the contextual situation of both parties is 
critical in determining whether administrative fairness has been achieved. However, the 
very commitment to context creates variability that can be seen as a threat to certainty 
and consistency. Of greater concern is the potential for the boundary between review 
and appeal to be blurred even while the courts profess a commitment to honouring this 
boundary.  
Under the common law, the practice of the classification of functions was a means 
for the judiciary to identify the nature of the administrative action under review and to 
then apply a pre-determined standard of review to that action. Assuming that the 
classification of functions remains discredited as a formalistic tool for judicial review, it 
continues to provide useful distinctions between types of administrative action. As Justice 
O’Regan has noted ‘… it is important to realize that there is a distinction that may, and 
should, be drawn between legislative and administrative functions, or between rule-
4 Bato Star Fishing v Minister of Environment Affairs and Tourism et el 2004 CCT 27/03 (CC) 
5 Minister of Health and Another v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others CCT 59/04 (CC) 
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making and adjudication’6 O’Regan notes that typically the two distinctions drawn 
between rule-making and adjudication are that: 
 rule-making is prospective while adjudication is retrospective 
 rule-making has a general application while adjudication is specific and particular. 
Drawing on a 1992 report by the Australian Administrative Review Council, she notes 
further that the distinctions should include that: 
 rule-making determines the content of the law while adjudication seeks to apply 
that law and 
 the results of rule-making are binding while the results from administrative action 
are generally not7 
This dissertation aims to consider recent developments in administrative law in 
regard to administrative adjudication by administrative tribunals. This last is a vast 
subject and is consequently limited in scope to a consideration of industry specific 
adjudicative or grievance tribunals, in particular those functioning within the financial 
services industry. 
Critics of judicial review as a means of achieving administrative justice point to the 
need for alternate methods that are cheaper, more efficient and more accessible and 
argue that the doctrine of separation of powers is partly dependent on administrators 
being acknowledged as the experts in the necessarily poly-centric decision making 
process. The argument, therefore, is that a system of tribunals and appeal tribunals 
would create the framework within which administrative agencies can regulate 
themselves subject to administrative justice principles with judicial review being the final 
recourse to abuses of public power. The arguments in favour of a system of tribunals 
6 O’Regan, C ‘Rules for Rule-making: Administrative Law and Subordinate Legislation’ (1993) Acta Juridica 
157 at 160 
7 Ibid  at 161 
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with a general appeals tribunal at the apex are discussed in chapter 5 below with specific 
reference to specialist grievance tribunals functioning within the financial services 
industry. As will be seen from an analysis of tribunal determinations and high court 
reviews of such determinations, the current tribunal system suffers from a lack of 
jurisdictional certainty, cohesion and, most significantly, a common standard of review.  
2. Doctrines of legality, rationality & reasonableness  
2.1. Introduction 
The inclusion of a right to administrative justice in the Constitution8 and the 
promulgation of national legislation9 designed to give effect to the Constitutional right 
has codified South African administrative justice principles. One would be forgiven for 
thinking that this process of codification has created certainty in respect of the standard 
of review to be applied by the judiciary and clarity on the role of judiciary within 
government structures as well as a comprehensive system to facilitate and enable 
participative democracy. This hoped for certainty has not however materialised. As 
Hoexter laments, PAJA was an ‘opportunity lost’ as it provides no viable alternate to 
judicial review in the form of a system of independent and impartial appeal tribunals that 
would allow the administrator to review its own actions and decisions10.  
If Hoexter’s criticism of PAJA is accepted, aggrieved citizens are still reliant primarily 
on the judicial process when challenging an administrative decision or action and the 
judiciary remains responsible for setting a standard of review that is an adequate 
safeguard against intentional or accidental abuses of power while maintaining an 
8 Section 33 of Act 108 of 1996 
9 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, hereinafter PAJA 
10 Hoexter, C ‘Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law’ (2000) 117(3) SALJ 484 at 497 
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appropriate level of deference. This discussion is focussed primarily on the review of 
determinations made by grievance tribunals in the financial services industry and 
consequently, the level of scrutiny and standard of review that a court may apply to such 
determinations. The inquiry consequently starts with an analysis of the various standards 
of review present in South African administrative law and an attempt to appreciate the 
implications of applying the prevailing standard, being a review for reasonableness. 
2.2. Doctrine of Legality 
Section 33 of the final Constitution offers a wide ranging option to any person wishing to 
enforce their right to just administrative action:  
(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair. 
(2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has 
the right to be given written reasons. 
(3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and must 
(a) provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where 
appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal; 
(b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsections (1) and 
(2); and 
(c) promote an efficient administration 
It seeks to protect the citizen from abuses of power, it suggests an obligation to 
promote participatory and open, transparent decision making, justifiable against reasons 
and balances the need to promote efficiency in the administration. In applying 
administrative justice to ‘everyone’ regardless of whether a right or interest or legitimate 
expectation has been impacted, the section honours the philosophy that administrative 
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justice should be based on a determinative theory and not a deprivation one11, albeit not 
as explicitly as S24 of the Interim Constitution12. 
The challenge to the courts in applying section 33 is perhaps in the far reaching 
nature of the section and the resultant need to limit or define administrative action. As 
Hoexter13 notes, the Constitutional Court has largely excluded those administrative or 
executive decisions that would not have met the requirements of ‘administrative action’ 
under the common law. One of the defining aspects of ‘administrative action’ is that it is 
concerned with the implementation of legislative provisions and not the making of policy 
or legislation which would rest within the scope of the executive and the legislature 
respectively. Thus in the SARFU14 case, the constitutional power of the State President to 
appoint a commission of enquiry was found to be an exercise of executive decision 
making discretion and not administrative action. In Fedsure Life15, the budgetary 
resolutions made by the local council were found to be legislative in nature and not 
reviewable under section 33.  In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers16, the State President’s 
decision to enact legislation while the backbone regulations were still pending was found 
not to be reviewable as administrative action as the action was clearly executive in 
nature as it required the exercise of political judgment, albeit as to the timing of 
implementing regulations. In so doing, the Court reinforced its commitment to 
maintaining a separation of powers but has not limited its own oversight function to 
11 Mureinik, E ‘Reconsidering Review: Participation and Accountability’ (1993) Acta Juridica at page 38 
12 Act 200 of 1993 
13 Hoexter, C op cit at note 10 
14 President of RSA and Others v SARFU and Others 1999 (10) BCLR 1059 (CC) 
15 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and 
others 1998 CCT7/98 
16 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa & Another v In re ex parte President of RSA 
2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) 
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those actions that are concerned only with the implementation of legislation, regardless 
of the identity of the administrative actor. In all three cases mentioned above, the Court 
found that even though the action complained of was not administrative in nature, the 
functionary was still subject to judicial oversight but under the doctrine of legality. In the 
Pharmaceuticals case, the Court confirmed its oversight function and the standard of 
review under the doctrine of legality as being a rationality standard and stated that: 
‘Decisions must be rationally related to the purpose for which the power was given, 
otherwise they are in effect arbitrary and inconsistent with this requirement’17.  
Consequently, the doctrine of legality requires that all public power must be 
exercised in terms of a constitutional principle of legality which sets a minimum threshold 
for the exercise of public power. This threshold is rationality and the requirement that 
actions taken remain within the powers conferred on the public body. As Hoexter notes, 
this may very well be applying administrative law principles by another name18 and that 
merely because public power is not administrative in nature does not mean that there 
are no constraints upon it. Hoexter states that this pragmatic and variable approach to 
the cases suggests that the legality principle is an extensive and convenient way of 
subjecting all public power to a set of minimum standards without the formalism of 
thresholds that define what is and what is not administrative action. She suggests that 
the judgments reflect the real concern of the Court, being the rejection of irrational or 
unreasonable action and a rejection of formalistic judicial review.  
This approach does not set the standard of review at proportionality, nor does it 
require administrators to give reasons, but it is an extensive general principle that 
requires that all public power conforms to minimum legality standards. Finally, it has the 
17 Ibid at para 85 
18 Hoexter, C op cit at note10 at page 506 
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advantage of developing a single system of public power justice and not two parallel 
systems of administrative law19.   
2.3. A variable approach 
Pillay suggests that ‘[t]he inclusion of rationality as a requirement for the legality of non-
administrative action, that is, action that does not involve the making of policy or 
legislation, implies that ordinary administrative action is susceptible to review on the 
higher standard’20 of reasonableness. 
Henderson describes the legality approach as being one where the actions of the 
executive and administration are held to a Constitutional standard that permits a 
generalist test that is not bound to doctrine: 
‘a Court can impute to Parliament an intention of constitutionality … on the premise 
that a prudent legislature would not intend the consequences of an authorising Act to 
run contrary to principles which, if applied to the Act, would invalidate an Act of 
Parliament’.21  
This concept of variability in administrative justice, or the ‘pragmatic and functional 
approach’, is canvassed by Mullan in an analysis of the Canadian Supreme Court’s 
approach to judicial review since the 1999 Baker22 case in which the standard of 
unreasonableness was applied. The case marked a shift in the standard of review applied 
by the Court from a relatively less strict correctness standard. The application of a 
19 Hoexter, C ‘The Principle of Legality in South African Administrative Law’ Macquarie Law Journal (2004) 
Vol 4 at page 184 
20 Pillay, A, ‘Reviewing Reasonableness: An Appropriate Standard for Evaluating State Action and Inaction’ 
(122) 2 (2005) SALJ 419 at 425 
21 Henderson, A ‘The Curative Powers of the Constitution’ (1998) 115 SALJ at page 354  
22 Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1999) 2 SCR – as reviewed in Mullan, D 
‘Deference from Baker to Suresh and Beyond – Interpreting the Conflicting Signals’ in D Dyzenhaus Public 
Law (Hart Publishing, 2004) 21 
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reasonableness standard caused some concern and it has been suggested that the Court 
reduced the level of deference to be accorded to the administrative tribunal as a review 
for reasonableness necessarily implies a consideration of not only the factors taken into 
account by the administrative agency but also the weight accorded to those factors.  
Mullan suggests that despite the seeming retreat by the Court in subsequent cases, a 
review for reasonableness is consistent with democracy and the separation of powers as 
the approach places less attention on the character of the decision maker and more 
attention on the nature of the interests at stake23. He suggests that a review for 
reasonableness is the correct standard when fundamental constitutional rights are 
impacted, thereby suggesting that a variable approach by the courts requires greater 
scrutiny of administrative decisions where the impact or outcome is particularly 
threatening to a constitutional right24.  
Section 6(2)(d) of PAJA provides that administrative action may be reviewed if: ‘The 
action was materially influenced by an error of law’. It has been suggested that errors of 
law are therefore reviewable against a standard of correctness but, as De Ville illustrates, 
it is improbable that there is one correct interpretation of a statutory provision and there 
is ‘little reason to believe that the courts’ interpretation of a statutory provision will 
always be “better” than that of the administrative body, especially where such body has 
developed an expertise within a specific field’25. De Ville suggests that the standard of 
review could differ or vary from reasonableness, rationality or correctness according to 
the matter at hand, expertise of the administrator and the scope of the discretion 
23 Ibid at page 53 
24 Ibid at page 57 
25 De Ville, J ‘Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa’ 1st ed (LexisNexis, 2005) at page 153 
Administrative Justice:  
K. Horsley  Page 14 of 97 
                                           
exercised. The correctness standard would be reserved for errors of constitutional 
interpretation or questions of jurisdiction26.  
The final drafting of PAJA perhaps provides less certainty and would seem to support 
the proposal that a range of standards can be applied to judicial review of administrative 
actions. A reading of section 6(2) illustrates that the legislature seems to have envisaged 
standards of review as including arbitrariness, rationality, proportionality and 
unreasonableness: 
6(2)(e)(vi) the action was taken – … arbitrarily or capriciously 
6(2)(f)(ii) the action itself is not rationally connected to-  
(aa) the purpose for which it was taken; 
(bb) the purpose of the empowering provision; 
(cc) the information before the administrator; or 
(dd) the reasons given for it by the administrator 
6(2)(h) the exercise  of the power … is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could 
have so exercised the power or performed the function 
2.4. Unreasonableness 
The Bato Star27 case was argued after the promulgation of PAJA but the judgment is 
silent on the range of possible standards of review present in section 6(2) of the Act. An 
analysis of the judgment would indicate that the Constitutional Court rejected the  
approach of considering the possible standards of review and selecting the most 
appropriate one according to the context and then applying that selected standard to the 
facts at hand. The Court’s preferred approach has been a single and simple standard of 
reasonableness.  
26 Ibid at page 154 
27 Bato Star Fishing v Minister Environmental Affairs and Tourism et el CC 2004 CCT 27/03 
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An unreasonableness standard is a significant shift from the common law position 
and is addressed by Justice O’Regan when considering the conjoined issues of review 
versus appeal and review for reasonableness. She noted that ‘pre-constitutional 
jurisprudence failed to establish reasonableness or rationality as a free standing ground 
of review’28 which required the presence of one of the common law grounds of review to 
be an indicator of unreasonableness. In respect of the PAJA definition of 
unreasonableness, O’Regan noted that the section must be read consistently with the 
constitution and, as section 33 does not prescribe the circuitous unreasonableness 
standard in PAJA, it should be read down to ‘be understood to require a simple test, 
namely, that an administrative decision will be reviewable if … it is one that a reasonable 
decision-maker could not reach’29. 
A review for reasonableness requires a consideration of the circumstances of each 
case and this, the Court found, would necessarily imply consideration of the nature of 
the decision, the identity and expertise of the decision-maker, the range of factors 
relevant to the decision, the reasons given for the decision, the nature of the competing 
interests involved and the impact of the decision on the lives and well-being of those 
affected30. This range of factors, which is not an exclusive list, to be considered in each 
case could be interpreted as a license for the courts to edge into a merits review. It 
certainly does permit a variable or, as Evans argues, a functional and pragmatic 
approach31. Taggart describes this approach, as constructed in the now famous CUPE v 
New Brunswick Liquor Corporation32, as one which was: ‘first applied to determine 
28 Ibid at para 43 
29 Ibid at para 44 
30 Ibid at para 45 
31 Evans, J ‘Deference with a Difference: Of Rights, Regulation and the Judicial Role in the Administrative 
State’ (2003) 120 SALJ 322 
32 (1997) 2 SCR 227 
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whether to defer to reasonable interpretations by expert decision-makers, but shortly 
thereafter was used also to influence the decision whether to characterize the error as 
jurisdictional in the first place’33. The approach is one where the courts may intervene in 
the decision of an administrative functionary if they are convinced of the correctness of a 
particular reading of the legislation. If they are unable to reach such a ‘correct’ 
interpretation, they should refrain from any intervention and defer to the agency’s 
preference as regards reasonableness34. Consequently, it is only where deference is not 
deserved that the Court will review the administrative action on a correctness standard.  
In South Africa, the scope of the debate regarding the appropriate standard of 
review has been engaged with the standards of rationality, justifiability, legality or 
lawfulness or reasonableness. Preceding judgments by the Constitutional Court such as 
the Bel Porto35 and Carephone v Marcus36 cases, were decided on a standard of 
justifiability that was interpreted as including a requirement that the decision be 
rational37. While the Bato Star judgment may be criticised for being either overly or 
insufficiently deferential, for the laissez faire reading down of the definition of 
unreasonableness or for failing to address the uncertainty created by the legislature’s 
inclusion of a range of standards of review in section 6(2) of PAJA but it is submitted 
that the judgment may be welcomed for the certainty provided by the finding that the 
correct standard of review of administrative action is one of reasonableness.  
A reasonableness standard provides scope to the judiciary to enquire into the societal 
and factual context of the case, and to give effect to the broad governing principles in 
the Constitution. Writing in 1993 and at this time in South Africa’s legal history clearly a 
33 Taggart, M ‘Outside Canadian Administrative Law’ (1996) 46 Toronto Law Journal 649 at 651 
34 Ibid 
35 School Governing Body and Others v Premier, Western Cape, and Another 2002 (3) SA 265 (CC)   
36 1998 (10) BCLR 1326 (LAC) 
37 See for example, Pillay, A, above at note 20 at 427 
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proponent of an increased activist role for the judiciary vis-à-vis the administration, 
Hlophe argues in favour of a reasonableness standard and states: ‘to put it bluntly, 
“unreasonableness” will provide our judiciary with the requisite muscle to challenge the 
abuse of discretionary powers by administrative bodies and officials’38. It is positions 
such as this, read in the current context where the state is entrusted with delivering 
massive socio-economic transformation, that feed the unease with a reasonableness 
standard as it creates a challenge for the judiciary to maintain the divide between judicial 
review and appeal and, consequently, the separation of powers so necessary to the 
modern democratic state.  
3. Judicial review as a means of achieving 
administrative justice   
3.1. Introduction 
In South Africa, judicial review has enjoyed primacy as a means of controlling the 
exercise of public power39.It is argued, however, that administrative law is broader and 
includes non-judicial safeguards that are more that a secondary review of the primary 
decision and should be aimed at generating good or better primary decisions40. The role 
and scope of administrative law has been described using the Harlow and Rawling’s 
38 Hlophe, J ‘Judicial Control of Administrative Action in a Post-Apartheid South Africa – some Realities’ 1993 
Acta Juridica 105 at page 112 
39 See, for example, Hoexter, C ‘Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law’ (2000) 117(3) 
SALJ 484 
40 Ibid at page 487 
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traffic-light metaphor41, which highlights the tension between a red-light and green-light 
approach to judicial intervention. On the one side of the spectrum, the role of the 
judiciary is one of restraining or controlling the state from implementing large scale 
socio-economic projects and interfering with personal liberties and private property. On 
the other side of the spectrum is a green-light philosophy where the role of the judiciary 
is one of assisting the state to regulate in a way that socio-economic intervention and 
redistribution is possible. Necessarily, a green-light approach requires a hands-off role by 
the courts where they are deferential to the legislature’s socio-economic and political 
imperatives and to the administrations interpretation and application of those intentions. 
As Taggart illustrates, however, if the green-light approach defines the judicial role as 
one which is custodial and supportive of socio-economic programmes, that role is less 
clear when governments move away from a social welfare state towards a cost-cutting, 
contracting and less interventionist political model, which he describes as a Thatcherist 
trend42.   
‘Having placed their [green-lighters or functionalist critics] faith in majoritarianism 
and the political process to deliver the right political results, they are dismayed that 
the swing of the political pendulum has delivered Right results. Trapped by their 
positivism and mistrust of the judiciary, they have been unable to build a theory to 
rival ... Dicey’s’43
Regardless, it can be argued that the judicial arena is one which is not well suited to 
collective and policy laden decision making, as engaged as judicial review is with the 
41 ‘Law and Administration’ 1984 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson). See for examples of discussions of this 
theory Hoexter, C ‘Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law’ 2000 117 (3) SALJ at page 
488; Taggart, M ‘Outside Canadian Administrative Law’ (1996) 46 Toronto Law Journal 649 at 655  
42 Ibid at page 656 
43 Dyzenhaus, D and Taggart, M ‘Judicial Review, Jurisprudence and the Wizard of Oz’ (1991) 1 PLR 21, 48 
quoted in Taggart, M ‘Outside Canadian Administrative Law’ (1996) 46 Toronto Law Journal 649 at 657 
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immediacy and restricted nature of a specific case where the parties are in an adversarial 
relationship and not a consensus seeking one.  
3.2. Scope of judicial review 
Hoexter provides a thorough analysis of the limitations of judicial review44, including the 
following: 
 There is no certainty that judicial review drives a significant change in the 
administrator’s behaviour or decision making. Any change can be attributed to a 
defence against challenge. 
 The outcome of judicial review does not necessarily provide justice for the 
participants as, more often than not, the decision is referred back to the original 
decision maker.  
 An open, transparent and democratic political process should be better suited than 
the courts when called on to identify, isolate and eradicate maladministration and 
poor or erroneous decision making. 
 Judicial review is necessarily backward looking and reactive. Certainly, industry 
specific tribunals, which are quasi-judicial in nature, are equally reactive, the main 
difference being that they are in a position within the political administration 
structure to influence or indeed drive regulatory changes or industry consultations.  
 The inaccessibility of the judicial process, being ‘slow, expensive and deeply 
mysterious to the layperson’45 
 The biggest challenge to the judicial process is that it is deeply undemocratic and 
does little to enhance meaningful participation and threatens the separation of 
powers so necessary to the functioning of a democratic state and the appropriate 
44 Hoexter, C op cit at note 10 at page 489 
45 Ibid at page 490 
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role of the courts. As Hoexter46 argues, however, judicial review of the merits is only 
undemocratic in the absence of a representative political institutions and it is thus 
only unwarranted intervention by the judiciary that is undemocratic. 
Arguments in favour of an integrated and systemic administrative law regime call for 
additional structures and mechanisms within the state infrastructure. Prior to the 
promulgation of PAJA, O’Regan argued in favour of legislative and executive overview in 
respect of subordinate legislation, consultation with affected and representative bodies 
as well as between government departments, public participation in rule-making within a 
formalised notice and comment procedure and access to information legislation47. She 
called for the development of rules for rule-making, including a central drafting office, 
periodical reviews of subordinate legislation, a register of subordinate legislation, 
consultation and interest group representation on rule-making bodies and notice and 
comment procedures48. PAJA, was meant to give effect to the constitutional right but, as 
Hoexter argues, it failed to add to the ‘bag of tools’49 available when engaged in the 
control of administrative power. She states that ‘The final drafters seemed to take the 
view that the instruction in section 33(3) to “promote efficient administration” justified 
them in jettisoning most of the provisions relating to future reform of the administrative 
system’50.  
This section began by questioning whether the codification of administrative 
principles has achieved the desired aim of certainty in administrative justive and whether 
a systemic alternate to judicial review has been created. While recognising the criticisms 
of the current legislative regime, it is equally important to recognise the vital role that 
46 Ibid at page 492 
47 Op cit at note6 at page 163 
48 Ibid at page 168 
49 Hoexter, C op cit at note 19 at page 177  
50 Ibid  
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administrative justice principles and judicial review plays in the modern state. In 
presenting a tragic litany of social assistance cases since 1996, Plasket51 provides 
examples of the practical application of administrative justice. Applicants disadvantaged 
by the administration of social assistance grants have been able to rely on the right to 
lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair administrative action. It is difficult to argue 
against an entrenched and justiciable right to administrative justice when it is being used 
to benefit the truly marginalised and voiceless. Certainly, the cases do not seem to 
extend the common law overly much but, as Corder has pointed out, section 33 was not 
intended to completely redefine administrative justice52. 
4. New Clicks and subordinate legislation  
4.1 Introduction 
As discussed above at chapter 2, PAJA was drafted to give effect to the right ‘lawful, fair 
and procedurally fair administrative action’ in the Constitution53. The issue of the 
applicability of section 33 in the light of PAJA was decided in Bato Star54, where Justice 
O’Regan reaffirmed the court’s findings in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers55, being that 
the control of public power is always a constitutional matter and that there is one system 
of administrative law that is grounded in the constitution, not in the doctrines of 
parliamentary sovereignty or ultra vires. The Court found that the ‘[c]ommon law informs 
51 Plasket, C ‘Administrative Justice and Social Assistance’ (2003) 120 SALJ 494 
52 Corder, H ‘A Cornerstone of South Africa’s Democracy’ (1998) 14 SAJHR at page 48 
53 Section 33(3) of Act 108 of 1996 
54 Bato Star Fishing v Minister of Environment Affairs and Tourism et el 2004 CCT 27/03 (CC) 
55 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa & Another v In re ex parte President of RSA 
2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) 
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PAJA and the Constitution and draws its force from the latter’56. The decision was 
seminal for a number of reasons, one of which is that it was the first Constitutional Court 
case where PAJA was argued and applied by the court. Significantly, the parties to the 
matter did not dispute the applicability of PAJA. 
In the New Clicks57 matter, however, PAJA’s applicability was contested specifically 
with reference to subordinate legislation. The case is enormously important to our 
understanding of administrative law and its evolution under South Africa’s constitutional 
democracy. The difficulty of this task is made clear when one notes that the Court was 
hardly united in its interpretation of administrative principles nor in the application of 
those principles to the facts.  
The New Clicks judgment relates to the making of subordinate legislation and the 
role that the courts play in holding the administrator to the constitutional principles of 
open, transparent and accountable government58. This discussion is concerned primarily 
with industry specific grievance tribunals as a means of achieving administrative justice. 
It is submitted that grievance tribunals are not however a complete alternative to judicial 
review. In fact, the quasi judicial nature of such tribunals, to use the classification of 
functions language, makes them more susceptible to judicial review. Effectively 
structured and utilised, however, tribunals can provide earlier, easier and more directed 
solutions for aggrieved citizens. Tribunal determinations should reflect an expert 
consideration that is alive to the multi-faceted policy considerations confronting 
administrators when implementing legislative enactments. They are tasked with 
enforcing and adjudicating legislation that is reflective of the will of the people as 
56 Supra at para 22 
57 Minister of Health and Another v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others CCT 59/04 (CC), decided 
30 September 2005 
58 Sections 1, 57 and 95 respectively of the Constitution – see chapter 4.4.1. below 
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expressed by their elected representatives. Tribunals are not however immune to the 
same intentional or accidental abuses of power found in other administrative actions and 
decisions.  
4.2 The facts of New Clicks 
Very briefly, the facts of the case are that in 1997, the Medicines and Related Substances 
Control Act59 [Medicines Control Act] was amended to introduce measures designed to 
make medicines more affordable, thereby giving effect to sections 27(1)(a) and 27(2) of 
the Constitution60.  
‘The newly introduced measures, …, do not fit comfortably into an act designed to 
serve other purposes … the grafted sections make provision for controls to be 
introduced in respect of production, importation, distribution and sales of medicines, 
the relaxation of certain patent restrictions, the promotion where possible of generic 
substitution of medicines, and the establishment of a Pricing Committee to make 
recommendations for the introduction of a pricing system for all medicines sold in the 
Republic.’61
As noted by the court, the measures ‘provoked strong opposition from with the 
pharmaceutical industry, including litigation challenging the validity of certain provisions 
of the amending legislation’62. A majority of the High Court dismissed these challenges 
59 Act 101 of 1965 
60 Section 27(1) ‘Everyone has the right to have access to – (a) health care services, …’ 
Section 27(2) ‘The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, 
to achieve the progressive realization of each of these rights’  
61 Minister of Health and Another v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others CCT 59/04 (CC), decided 30 
September 2005 at para 2 
62 Ibid at para 3 
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but leave to appeal was granted. The Supreme Court of Appeal decided unanimously 
that the regulations were invalid.  
4.3 Administrative justice as an entrenched right and 
after codification 
The Court found unequivocally that PAJA was enacted to give effect to section 33 of the 
Constitution and that ‘a litigant cannot avoid the provisions of PAJA by going behind it, 
and seeking to rely on section 33(1) of the Constitution or the common law’63. Quoting 
Hoexter, with approval, Chaskalson CJ found that the common law can be used to inform 
the Constitution and PAJA but may not circumvent either and that the principle of 
legality64 remains a fall-back position for those situations where PAJA does not apply65. 
Having acknowledged that South African administrative law owed its early development 
to English doctrines law66, he noted that certain provisions of PAJA had been 
transplanted from German and Australian provisions. This aspect of PAJA has been 
roundly criticised on the basis that they potentially introduce provisions that are at odds 
with South African administrative law67. Chaskalson CJ was not however prepared to 
borrow the interpretation of these provisions and stated that:  
PAJA must, however, be interpreted by our courts in the context of our law, and not 
in the context of the legal systems from which provisions may have been borrowed. 
In neither of the countries is there a defined constitutional right to just administrative 
action. Transplanting provisions from such countries into our legal and constitutional 
63 Ibid at para 96 
64 As applied in the Sarfu, Fedsure  and Pharmaceutical Manufacturers; notes 14; 15; and 16 above 
65 Supra at para 97 
66 Supra at para 102 
67 Hoexter, C ‘The New Constitutional and Administrative Law’ Vol 2 (Juta, 2002) at 107-110 
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framework may produce results different from those obtained in the countries from 
which they have been taken.68
In his consideration of the state of administrative law in South Africa, Sachs J 
concurred with Chaskalson CJ and found that an applicant cannot bypass PAJA. He 
differs in one significant respect, however, being whether PAJA is the starting point for 
any administrative law enquiry. He found that: ‘The point of departure for the enquiry 
cannot be PAJA itself. The statute may refine constitutional provisions; it cannot define 
it’.69
In the context of determining that PAJA does not apply to subordinate legislation, 
which is discussed in more detail at 4.5 below, he found that neither PAJA nor section 33 
of the Constitution apply at a macro level: 
‘I believe that section 33 and PAJA are together designed to control the exercise of 
public power in a special and focused manner, with the object of protecting 
individuals or small groups in their dealings with the public administration from unfair 
processes or unreasonable decisions… the principles of legality in a constitutional 
democracy, on the other hand, operate more at a macro level ... these principles, ..., 
should have a larger ad more context-driven sweep’70
As intriguing as this suggestion may be, nothing seems to turn on it, as Sachs J 
himself acknowledges: 
‘Against this background whether judicial review of delegated legislation is conducted 
through the lens of legality, as I believe it should be, or through the prism of section 
33 and PAJA, as the Chief Justice holds, the consequences should be roughly the 
68 Supra at para 142 
69 Supra at para 586 
70 Supra at para 583 
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same. In both cases judicial review should be animated by the same constitutional 
philosophy.’71
Moseneke J, with Justices Madala, Mokgoro and Skweyiya concurring, confirmed the 
Court’s finding in Bato Star that: 
‘It is now well settled that in our constitutional democracy the exercise of all public 
power must occur lawfully and is susceptible to judicial scrutiny … Clearly, section 
22G does not immunize the regulation-making power of the Minister from judicial 
scrutiny. It is trite that a wielder of public power must exercise the power lawfully. 
This means the authority must be exercised within the bounds set by the 
empowering legislation, in a rational manner and within the constraints of the 
Constitution.’ [footnotes omitted]72  
It is clear from the above that the standard for judicial scrutiny of the exercise of all 
public power when reviewed against the Constitution is one of legality or rationality. 
PAJA, on the other hand, sets the standard of review of administrative action at 
reasonableness, which is potentially a much broader standard that may blur the 
boundary between review and appeal on the merits73. Further, it is clear that the 
litigation route to the entrenched section 33 right is via PAJA. A direct route is possible 
only in situations where PAJA cannot apply. Consequently, much turns on whether PAJA 
applies or not, not least the question of the role of the judiciary and the scope of its 
over-sight function.  
4.4 Judicial deference 
In New Clicks, Sachs J, found that neither section 33 nor PAJA were applicable to 
subordinate legislation74, but did console with the view that these remedies ‘do not stand 
alone as bulwarks against arbitrary and inappropriate use of public power’ and that 
71 Supra at para 585 
72 Supra at para 716 
73 Acknowledged by Chaskalson Supra at para 108 
74 Supra at para 583 
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‘judicial review of subordinate legislation can be more effectively and robustly done if not 
forced to tip-toe in the narrow pedestal appropriate for reviewing administrative acts’ 
[footnotes omitted]75. This position seems to suggest that by not subjecting subordinate 
legislation to the administrative justice principles codified in PAJA, the Court could 
exercise less deference than one would expect. It begs the question as to whether this 
approach is supportive of the doctrine of separation of powers and whether it would not 
lead the Court into political and value laden territory. The issue of deference and the 
judicial role within a democratic state deserves a brief mention here as Justice Sachs’ 
position is noteworthy given the Court’s commitment, in Bato Star, to deference, the 
separation of powers and remaining within the limits of judicial review and not judicial 
appeal in matters which are polycentric and politically value laden. 
In Bato Star, the Court tackled the issue of an unelected and unaccountable, albeit 
independent, judiciary reviewing the actions and decisions of the administration. The 
judicial structure is conceived within the separation of powers doctrine as being 
responsible for implementing state policy and is itself immune from judicial interference. 
The Court analysed its own role in the democratic process as being one of deference to 
the function of the administration but reconfirmed the importance of maintaining an 
over-sight role. The Court noted that the partial solution to this dichotomous position is 
the concept of deference as respect and not submission76, as proposed by Dyzenhaus77, 
who argues that democracy requires a balance to be maintained between judges 
legitimately resisting an encroachment on fundamental individual rights and liberties and 
recognising that politicians determine the values that form part of the law. He suggests, 
therefore, that deference should be read as being respectful of the reasons supporting 
75 Supra at para 609 
76 Supra at para 46 
77 Dyzenhaus, D ‘The Politics of Deference” Judicial Review and Democracy’ in M Taggart The Province of 
Administrative Law (1997) 279 
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the decision regardless of whether the decision is based in statute, common law or from 
another Court78. Dyzenhaus recognises the difficulty that the courts have in setting a 
standard that will respect the bright line between review on substantive grounds, 
maintaining respect for the decision maker, and a “hands off” approach. He notes, 
however, that deference as respect is wholly democratic as all public power must be 
justified against the reasons given for the exercise of that public power79. 
Consequently, it is argued, the notion of deference may rescue judicial review from 
being an undemocratic interference with the administrative arm of government. This 
position has been taken by Hoexter who argues that the desired level of judicial 
deference is one of according the administration due respect and being sensitive to the 
legitimately pursued interest. This position, she argues, ‘is perfectly consistent with a 
concern for individual rights and a refusal to tolerate corruption and maladministration’80. 
This theory of deference finds support in the “pragmatic and functional” approach of the 
Canadian judiciary81. 
The difficulty with this position, as argued by De Ville82, is that in determining 
whether a power lies within the sphere of another branch of government, the Court is 
actually determining or making law and, consequently, not demonstrating deference. De 
Ville notes that the position that a doctrine deference can rescue judicial review from 
being anti-democratic is reliant on a belief that politics and law can be separated, which 
boundary, he argues, is notoriously difficult to determine and easy to manipulate83. De 
78 Ibid at page 286 
79 Ibid at page 305 
80 Hoexter, C op cit at note 10 at page 501 
81 See, for example, Evans, J ‘Deference with a Difference: Of Rights, Regulation and the Judicial Role in the 
Administrative State’ (2003) 120 SALJ 322; Mullan, D ‘Deference from Baker to Suresh and Beyond – 
Interpreting the Conflicting Signals’ in D Dyzenhaus Public Law (Hart Publishing, 2004) 21 
82 De Ville, J ‘Deference as Respect and Deference as Sacrifice’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 577 at page 589 
83 Ibid at page 591 
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Ville goes further to argue that the Court in Bato Star left the method of implementing 
transformation to the discretion of the decision maker stating that the method of 
implementation was a policy decision. On the face of it, the Court’s statement seems un-
contentious however De Ville’s argument is that this is in fact a determination on the 
breadth and depth of the scope of that discretion84. He notes that the Court followed a 
legal process involving ‘institutional competence, reasoned elaboration and 
majoritarianism’ and, in so doing, acknowledged that reaching agreement on the means 
of achieving a result is possible while agreement on the outcome is less so. He suggests 
that the Bato Star Court adopted the approach of determining the best sphere of 
government to make the decision and deferred to it85. In acknowledging the use of a 
broadly contextual approach, the Court recognises that the context is without boundaries 
and De Ville argues that the very act of fixing the context is in itself a decision of a 
political nature86. 
In a similar vein, Allan takes the view that judicial review is principle and rule bound 
and that ‘Legal principles limit executive freedom but do not substitute judicial discretion 
for ministerial discretion’87. He argues that judicial deference is merely ‘a function of the 
generality of legal standards that equality entails’88. His concluding position is that 
deference should reflect the balance of reason in a particular case and that deference 
should not be an automatic judicial restraint, even in matters of national security, as 
automatic deference can lead to a serious undermining of constitutional rights89. In fact, 
84 Ibid 
85 Ibid at page 594 
86 Ibid at page 596 
87 Allan, TRS ‘Common Law Reasons and the Limits of Judicial Deference’ in D Dyzenhaus The Unity of Public 
Law (Hart Publishing, 2004) 289 
88 Ibid at page 291 
89 Ibid 305 
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he suggests that respect for the expertise and policy-making function of the executive is 
inherent in the judicial review process and there is therefore no reason for a free-
standing doctrine of deference as deference rests on crude distinctions between spheres 
of courts and agencies and is insufficiently attuned to the circumstances of each case. All 
administrative action, should therefore be reviewable against the ideal of equality which 
forces the executive to justify any disparate or exceptional treatment of individuals90. 
In summary therefore, deference to the administrative decision maker, as fraught as 
it is with contradictions and challenges, is based on the doctrine of the separation of 
powers and the recognition that the administrative role is one of implementing the will of 
the people. Further, the practice of deference is also on the assumption that the 
administrator possesses the necessary expertise and understanding of symbiotic policy 
decisions. Both these justifications for deference are relevant to the decisions of 
grievance or adjudicative tribunals. It can be argued that the quasi-judicial nature of 
grievance tribunals calls for less judicial deference as the courts must be seen as experts 
on adjudicative processes and the judicial process is no stranger to the requirement of 
subject-matter expertise. It remains, however, that the budgetary, socio-economic, 
political and policy implications of tribunal determinations make deference by the 
judiciary a necessity even if the level of such deference is open to debate.  
4.5 Applicability of PAJA to subordinate Legislation 
4.5.1 General 
As mentioned at 4.1. above, the issue of whether PAJA is applicable to the making of 
subordinate legislation was critical to the Court’s finding in New Clicks. If PAJA cannot be 
said to apply, the generalist doctrine of legality would be applicable as opposed to the 
90 Ibid 306 
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principles of administrative justice and, consequently, the standard of review would be 
the relatively lower one of legality or rationality and not the PAJA unreasonableness 
standard. 
Chaskalson CJ noted that the Interim Constitution91 specifically permitted judicial 
review of subordinate legislation and that the final Constitution contained no provision 
that may suggest a legislative intention to exclude the review of subordinate legislation. 
He found, rather, that the legislative drafting points in the opposite direction, citing the 
values of accountability, responsiveness and openness as well as a participatory, 
accountable and transparent democracy provided for in sections 1, 57 and 95 
respectively of the Constitution92. He argued that  
‘The making of delegated legislation by members of the executive is an essential part 
of public administration. It gives effect to the policies set by the legislature and 
provides the detailed infrastructure according to which this is done … To hold that 
the making of delegated legislation is not part of the right to just administrative 
action would be contrary to the Constitution’s commitment to open and transparent 
government.’93  
The Chief Justice acknowledged that subjecting delegated legislation to the 
administrative justice standard of being ‘reasonable and procedurally fair’ is a higher 
standard than demanded in a pre-Constitutional era94 but found that to apply the lower 
standard would create two systems of review - one under the common law for delegated 
legislation and one under the Constitution for administrative action. This, he found could 
not be consistent with section 33 which provides for a coherent and overarching system 
for review of all administrative action and would not be consistent with the values of the 
91 Act 200 of 1993 
92 Supra at para’s 110 - 112 
93 Supra at para 113 
94 Supra at para 115 
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constitution95. Consequently, PAJA would apply to delegated or subordinate legislation 
when such legislation is made by an organ of state exercising a public power, as both 
the Minister of Health and the Pricing Committee were96. 
Chaskalson CJ’s judgment may be welcomed for its certainty and its commitment to a 
consistent, single standard of review for both administrative action and subordinate 
legislation. The resultant simplicity is attractive. His fellow justices, however, did not fully 
concur and his finding on this issue and he must remain in the minority. 
Ngcobo J, with Justices Langa, O’Regan and Van Der Westhuizen concurring, decided 
the matter on a narrower basis, being that PAJA may not necessarily apply to the making 
of all subordinate legislation but, on the facts of this case, it did apply to the regulations 
made under section 22G of the Medicines Control Act97. The reasoning was based in the 
“uniqueness” of section 22G which required that neither the Minister nor the Pricing 
Committee could act independently and, therefore, the process followed by the pricing 
committee and the making of regulations were interlinked98.  
It is not my intention to attempt a contradictory argument but it is submitted that the 
honourable justice’s use of the term “unique” when describing the process of the making 
of regulations under the Medicines Control Act is unfortunate. The term may be read as 
meaning that no other regulatory making process can require two functionaries with 
different but interdependent functions and therefore closing the door in future matters 
where subordinate legislation is challenged on grounds contained in PAJA. This may 
indeed have been the intention but it is submitted that the issue is far from resolved. As 
O’Regan notes,  
95 Supra at para 118 
96 Supra at para 121 
97 Supra at para 422 
98 Supra at para 441 
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‘… although Ngcobo J decides the question of the applicability of the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act, 3 of 2000, on a narrower basis than Chaskalson CJ, much 
of the reasoning he employs in doing so seems equally applicable to me to the wider 
question …’99.  
The position that the regulations under section 22G, in terms of a statutory and 
symbiotic relationship between the Minister of Health and the Pricing Committee, are in 
fact “unique” is unconvincing. This paper is focussed on the financial services industry 
and the industry specific adjudicative or grievance tribunals created in statute. As 
Ngcobo J notes, section 22G(2) of the Medicines Act provides that ‘the Minister may, on 
the recommendation of the pricing committee, make regulations …’ as far as these 
regulations relate to a transparent pricing systems and a single dispensing fee100. Section 
5 of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act101 creates an Advisory 
Committee made up of representatives from industry, the regulator and government and 
section 15(1) provides that the Registrar must consult this committee on the drafting of 
subordinate legislation. The Advisory Committee is even to be consulted on the 
appointment of the industry ombud and deputy ombud102 and on the drafting and 
implementation of the rules in respect of the complaints and investigations that the 
ombud may undertake103. It is submitted that it is not “unique” for the administrative 
decision maker to be constrained in their discretion either to consider the 
recommendation of a secondary or advisory body, to consult with that body or to 
implement its recommendations. 
99 Supra at para 849 
100 Supra at para 439 
101 Act 57 of 2002, hereinafter ‘FAIS’ 
102 Section 21(1)(a) and (b) 
103 Section 26(1) 
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Moseneke J104 made the compelling point that the Supreme Court of Appeal had not 
fully considered the issue as PAJA’s applicability was not one of the issues that aggrieved 
the Minister and he therefore did not consider himself to have had ‘the benefit of full 
argument on a matter of much, much importance for the proper development of our 
administrative law’105.  
Moseneke J, with Justices Madala, Mokgoro, Skweyiya and Yacoob concurring106, 
found that he considers ‘it neither prudent nor necessary to decide, in this case, the 
complex and contested issue of the proper standard of review of ministerial law-making 
… review under PAJA is not one of the grounds on which the Minister felt aggrieved and 
approached this Court’107 and assumed without deciding that the grounds of review in 
PAJA did apply to the recommendation of the Pricing committee and the subordinate 
legislation108. 
Section 4 of PAJA provides for the procedure to be followed by administrators when 
making subordinate legislation. Once the action is found to be ‘administrative’ within the 
section 1 definition, section 4 applies as to procedure, the final choice of which rests with 
the administrator. As noted by Chaskalson CJ, section 4 would seem to indicate that the 
legislature had the making of subordinate legislation in mind when drafting PAJA. It 
would therefore be surprising if provision was made for the procedure to be followed, 
which would then be reviewable, but the reasonableness and lawfulness of such 
subordinate legislation would not be109. 
104 With Madala, Mokgoro and Skweyiya JJ concurring 
105 Supra at para 723 
106 Making Moseneke’s finding on this issue the majority decision of the Court 
107 Supra at para 722 
108 Supra at para 724 
109 Supra at para 133 
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4.5.2 Exclusions from the definition of ‘administrative 
action’ 
Chaskalson CJ’s judgment rests partly on an analysis of the exclusions from the definition 
of ‘administrative action’ found in section 1(i) of PAJA and notes that, in respect of the 
first exclusion, which relates to the President’s powers, all of section 85 of the 
Constitution is included in the PAJA exception but for the implementation of national 
legislation. The definition thus includes policy setting; co-ordination of state 
departments; preparing and initiating legislation. Again, when cross checking the section 
125110 exclusion contained in the PAJA definition, he noted that the implementation of 
legislation is again excluded111. He consequently found that the implementation of 
national legislation by the President and Cabinet members is administrative in nature and 
therefore justiciable under section 33. In support of this finding, he noted that it would 
have been a simple thing for the legislature to have incorporated the full provisions of 
sections 85 and 125 thus clearly communicating the legislative intention to exclude all 
executive powers, including the making of subordinate legislation, from the definition of 
administrative action. The failure by the legislature to do so must be seen as deliberate. 
Finally, Chaskalson CJ found that the implementation of legislation includes the making 
of regulations in terms of the empowering provision and is therefore not excluded from 
the definition of ‘administrative action’112.  
Turning to the earlier judgment, the High Court excluded the review of subordinate 
legislation from the scope of PAJA on the basis that the definition of ‘administrative 
action’ expressly excludes any action taken in terms of section 4(1), which deals, inter 
alia, with the procedure to be followed by the administrator in the creation and 
110 Section 125 of the Constitution dealing with the powers of the provincial executive 
111 Supra at para’s 124 and 125 
112 Supra at para 126 
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publication of subordinate legislation. Chaskalson CJ, however, determined that section 
4(1) relates to the procedure selected by the administrator, which would not be 
reviewable under PAJA, but not the regulations themselves, which would be so 
reviewable113. 
On the same issue, Ngcobo J stated that the power conferred on the Minister and the 
Pricing Committee in terms of section 22G involved the implementation of a transparent 
pricing system; fixing of an appropriate dispensing fee and fixing of an appropriate fee 
for wholesalers and distributors and found that the nature and subject matter of these 
functions is concerned with the implementation of legislation114. The Court’s commitment 
to a variable approach to administrative justice as opposed to a formalistic or procedural 
on is reflected in Ngcobo J’s judgment: 
‘To suggest that the performance of these functions does not amount to 
implementation of legislation and therefore administrative action, because the 
Minister performs these functions through regulations [and not primary legislation], 
seems to me, to put form above substance’115.  
Ngcobo J concured with Chaskalson CJ’s finding regarding the omission of 
subordinate legislation from the exclusions from ‘administrative action’ listed in section 1. 
He noted, however, that the legislative text used the term ‘including’ before listing, inter 
alia, the sections 85 and 125 functions of Executive116 which would not typically indicate 
113 Supra at para 133 
114 Supra at para 450 
115 Ibid 
116 Section 1(i) Any decision or failure to take a decision … which adversely affects the rights of any person, 
… but does not include –  
(aa) the executive powers or functions of the National Executive, including the powers or functions referred 
to in sections … 85(2)(b), (c), (d) and (e) … 
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an exhaustive list117. Looking at the word ‘including’ in context however, Ngcobo J found 
that the power to implement legislation was conspicuous by its omission. Critically, the 
executive functions listed did not go beyond the generally understood functions and 
powers of the executive and therefore the list did not extend or amplify the meaning. 
Consequently, the legislature must have intended, by using the word ‘including’, to 
narrow the definition118. Finally, he concurred with Chaskalson CJ on the issue that, had 
the legislature indeed expressly excluded the implementation of legislation from the 
scope of PAJA, it would have excluded ‘the very core of administrative action’119 and that 
PAJA would therefore not give effect to the Constitutional right to administrative justice.  
Ngcobo J reviewed the definition of ‘administrative action’ in PAJA and notes that it 
‘is in line with the decision of this Court in Fedsure and Sarfu 3’120. This makes for an 
interesting and circuitous method for the Court to establish legislative intent based on 
the legislature incorporating the Court’s own definitions. It is a useful illustration of the 
fiction involved in a court determining legislative intent while attempting to maintain 
strict separation of powers. 
Sachs J retained the view that the definition of ‘administrative action’ was concerned 
exclusively with the adjudicative process between individuals121 but also cited Hoexter’s 
criticism of the Act which is that the section 8 remedies in PAJA are silent on the power 
to declare subordinate legislation, which is a major part of out judicial review history, 
and therefore focuses on decisions, rights, actions which provides no clarity on the 
applicability of PAJA to subordinate legislation122.  
117 Supra at para 455 
118 Supra at para 459 
119 Supra at para 461 
120 Supra at para 464 
121 Supra  at para 596 
122 Supra at para 604 
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4.5.3 The meaning of ‘direct external effect’ 
The Court was united generally on one issue, being that the making of regulations in 
terms of section 22G was a two stage but inter-related process where a recommendation 
was made by the Pricing Committee while the decision to implement was within the 
Minister’s discretion. The applicant relied on the definition of ‘administrative action’ in 
section 1 of PAJA to argue that the recommendation of the Pricing Committee did not 
have a direct, external legal effect123. Per Chaskalson CJ, ‘In the circumstances of the 
present case, to view the two stages of the process as unrelated, separate and 
independent decisions, each on its own having to be subject to PAJA124, would be to put 
form over substance’. Sachs J however was persuaded by the German and Australian 
interpretation, which is that ‘a direct, external legal effect’ means, inter alia, that the 
making of subordinate legislation is excluded from the definition of administrative 
action125. As discussed above at chapter 4.3126, Chaskalson CJ was not persuaded by this 
argument. 
4.6 Review for reasonableness 
Despite having found that either PAJA does apply to all subordinate legislation, or that it 
applies in the specific circumstances of the New Clicks case, the Court, as will be seen 
from the discussion that follows, seems to have tested the subordinate legislation against 
the general grounds of lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair grounds listed in section 
33 of the Constitution and not against the specific grounds listed in section 6(2) of PAJA.  
123 Section 1(i) Any decision or failure to take a decision … which adversely affects the rights of any person 
and has a direct, external legal effect but does not include – … 
124 Presumably specifically the reference to ‘direct, external legal effect’ in PAJA 
125 Supra at para 599 
126 Supra at para 142 see note 68 
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Chaskalson CJ is succinct in his analysis of the standards of lawfulness and 
reasonableness: 
‘PAJA addresses the four requirements of the Constitution relating to just 
administrative action: lawfulness, reasonableness, procedural fairness and the 
provision of reasons … Lawfulness is relevant to the exercise of all public power, 
whether or not the exercise of the power constitutes administrative action. Where the 
making of regulations is challenged on this ground, lawfulness depends on the terms 
of the empowering statute. If the regulations are not sanctioned by the empowering 
statute they will be unlawful and invalid. … Reasonableness and procedural fairness 
are context specific.’ [footnotes omitted] 127
The judgments of Chaskalson CJ and Moseneke J reaffirmed the findings of the Court 
in Bato Star128 which are discussed above at chapter 2.4. In this case, the issue turned 
on whether the regulations made in terms of section 22G of the Medicines Control Act 
were ‘appropriate’ in the context and therefore whether they were reasonable129. One of 
the challenges to a reasonableness standard is that its context driven and variable 
nature, makes it possible for an overzealous court to subject the administrative decision 
maker to a merits review130. In determining whether the regulations were ‘appropriate’, 
Moseneke J evaluated the evidence led by both parties seemingly with an eye to 
determining whether the data used by the Pricing Committee in their recommendation 
supported the dispensing fee set131 and therefore whether the Pricing Committee had 
been correct in its analysis of the data. This illustrates the difficulty that a reasonability 
standard may present as regards judicial deference and the distinction between appeal 
127 Supra at para’s 143 - 145 
128 Supra at para’s 187 and 725 
129 Supra at para’s 188 and 713 
130 See discussion at chapter 2.4 above 
131 Supra at para’s 726 - 782 
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and review. Moseneke J states that the term ‘appropriate’ is not in itself immutable but 
subject to a range of reasonableness where the fee may be considered ‘proper, well-
suited and fair’132. He does not restrict his review to a consideration of the nature of the 
decision; the identity and expertise of the decision maker; the range of factors relevant 
to the decision; the reasons given for the decision; the nature of the competing interests 
and the impact of the decision on the lives of those affected133 but considered the levels 
of returns needed for a pharmacy to remain viable, market forces, profitability and 
business models, polycentric issues that are surely best suited to the expert 
administrative decision maker. In his conclusion, he stated: 
‘It is not surprising that the expert evidence falls short of resolving several intractable 
issues associated with the assessment of the viability of a business. It is trite that an 
enterprise must realise an adequate return on capital. The challenge is fixing an 
appropriate level of return. The evidence does not venture to fix one. The evidence 
rightly notes that an adequate return is always relative to the market structure and 
its inherent risks. The Pharmacies submitted to the Pricing Committee and in 
evidence that a 26% gross profit margin on sales will lead to an adequate return on 
capital. But the evidence does not show that there is a fixed equation between 
financial viability and gross profit. … The extravagant conclusion that the regulated 
dispensing fee will force pharmacies to go to the wall is in my view premature and is 
not adequately predicted by the evidence.’134
It is submitted that Moseneke’s judgment, with respect, is at best a merits review 
and potentially an appeal in the wide sense. One would have expected the honourable 
justice to limit the reasonableness review to questions such as the staffing and expertise 
132 Supra at para 713 
133 Bato Star supra  at note 4 at para 45 
134 Supra at para’s 784 - 785 
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of the Pricing Committee135, whether it had adequately considered the macro and micro 
economic impact of their recommendation, whether relevant factors were considered and 
irrelevant factors excluded, the rationality of the reasons given by the Committee and 
whether the Committee could demonstrate that it had considered and weighed the 
interests of the pharmacies against the political imperative to establish affordable and 
accessible medicines. 
4.7 Review for lawfulness136 
4.7.1 Vagueness 
The single exit price set in terms of Regulation 22G was challenged on the grounds of 
vagueness. Hoexter137 has noted that the section 6(2) grounds of review under PAJA do 
not include the common law grounds of vagueness, disproportionality and rigidity. 
Chaskalson CJ, however, notes that: 
‘It seems to have been assumed by the parties, and in my view correctly so, that 
vagueness is a ground for review under PAJA. Although vagueness is not specifically 
mentioned in PAJA as a ground for review, it is within the purview of section 6(2)(i) 
which includes as a ground for review, administrative action that is otherwise 
‘unconstitutional or unlawful’. This Court has held that the doctrine of vagueness is 
based on the rule of law which is a foundational value of our Constitution’ [citing inter 
135 Ngcobo J does find on this issue at paragraph 522 but within the context of a review for lawfulness which 
is discussed in detail chapter IV section 5(ii) below 
136 Although there is a lack of consistency between each judgment as regards the elements of ‘Lawfulness’ 
considered by each justice, an analysis of the full judgment shows that the Court reviewed the regulations 
for lawfulness on the grounds of vagueness, relevance and ultra vires. The discussion that follows is 
therefore structured on this basis. 
137 Hoexter, C op cit at note 10 at page 497 
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alia Affordable Medicines Trust and Others v Minister of Health pf RSA and Another 
2005(6) BCLR 529 (CC) at para 108]138. 
The doctrine of vagueness thus means that laws must be written in a clear and 
accessible manner with reasonable certainty. Perfect lucidity is not required and the 
doctrine should not be used to hamper the legitimate government socio-economic 
objective139.  
As Sachs J found that the Regulations, as they relate to a single exit price, were 
unlawful albeit on a general application of the doctrine of legality, and not on the 
grounds of vagueness, the Court had sufficient majority to find that the single exit price 
was unlawful. However, five members of the Court140 found that they were not vague, 
while accepting the Chief Justice’s analysis of the law. Yacoob J’s analysis is useful to 
consider as it adds to our understanding of ‘vagueness’. He stated that, certainly, the 
drafter’s duty is to set out regulations that are not difficult to interpret and are clear 
however some difficulty or lack of clarity does not excuse the court from the obligation to 
try and understand them141. Having analysed regulation 7 and 8, the Honourable Justice 
provided alternate wording for the regulations which would give better effect to his 
interpretation of the legislature’s intention.  
4.7.2 Relevance 
The dispensing fee made in terms of section 22G was challenged on the grounds of 
relevance. The issue therefore was whether the administrator took into account all 
relevant factors and excluded any irrelevant factors when making the decision in 
question. Chaskalson CJ, reconfirmed that while the judiciary is obliged to defer to the 
138 Supra at para 246 
139 Ibid 
140 Yacoob, Moseneke, Madala, Mokgoro and Skweyiya JJ 
141 Supra at para 822 
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expertise of the administrator in regard to the range of factors to be considered, the 
Court should not merely ‘rubber-stamp’ the decision on the basis of the identity of the 
decision maker142. On an analysis of the evidence, the Chief Justice found that the 
Pricing Committee, having invited oral representations from the affected parties, was 
obliged to consider such representation. On the evidence, the Pricing Committee had 
relied only on the written submissions and, consequently, failed to take into account 
relevant factors.  From paragraph 311 to 388, Chaskalson CJ considered the evidence as 
regards viability of the pharmacies in the face of the prescribed dispensing fee. He does 
not however opine on the accuracy or completeness of this evidence but finds that: 
‘The Pricing Committee has provided no models or other evidence to demonstrate 
how the dispensing fee was calculated or how the members of the Pricing Committee 
satisfied themselves that it was appropriate. It has not told us what assumptions it 
made about the probable [single exit price] in calculating the dispensing fee, or how 
it assessed the dispensing fee when it seems to have had no data dealing with 
dispensary revenue and expenses which it considered to be essential for that purpose 
… the failure to make provision for compounding in the dispensing fee is a material 
misdirection’ [emphasis added] 143
While the Court generally concurred with the Chief Justice’s interpretation and 
application of the grounds of taking into account relevant factors, his finding as regards 
his analysis of the evidence144 is not a decisive one. The majority of the Court145 did not 
concur that the Pricing Committee had failed to take account of relevant factors by 
failing to consider the oral submissions made by the Pharmacies. The Chief Justice 
seemed to have held the administrative decision maker to a higher standard by finding 
                                           
142 Supra at para 390 
143 Supra at para 403 
144 Ngcobo, O’Regan and Van der Westhuizen concurring 
145 Yacoob J with Moseneke, Madala, Mokgoro, Skweyiya, and Langa JJ concurring 
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that the Constitutional values of ‘accountability, responsiveness and openness’ required 
the administrator to demonstrate that it had considered the allegations made by the 
Pharmacies in respect of the dispensing fee being set at a level that would challenge 
their viability, and having failed to demonstrate this, it cannot be said that the Pricing 
Committee and the Minister had taken into account all relevant factors. Significantly, the 
Chief Justice did not attempt to analyse the evidence to determine whether the 
dispensing fee would, in fact, challenge viability. His finding was based on the 
administrator’s inability to demonstrate that this had been properly considered. It is 
submitted that, regardless of the outcome or evidence, this is the correct theoretical 
approach to a review of administrative action as it steers clear of an appeal on the 
merits, a merits review or a consideration of the substance while still holding the 
administrator accountable for decisions made and actions taken. 
Ngcobo J concurred with the Chief Justice on the issue of relevance but, writing his 
own judgment, emphasised the importance of the judiciary remaining respectful of the 
boundary between appeal and review and of retaining deference towards the 
administrator’s expertise and position. This position is well summarised in the following 
extract: 
‘The determination of an appropriate dispensing fee is informed by both economic 
and other policy considerations. And as the Chief Justice observes, the task of the 
Pricing Committee calls for expertise and understanding of a complex market in 
which medicines are traded. The Pricing Committee possesses such expertise and it 
consists of individuals with diverse backgrounds and experience in these matters. 
Courts have no expertise in these matters. As a general matter, they should only 
interfere with a fee fixed by the Pricing Committee if the fee is one that is beyond the 
range of what is appropriate.’146
146 Supra at para 522 
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On the facts, the failure of the Pricing Committee and the Minister to properly take 
into account the viability of community pharmacies, albeit being ‘alive’ 147to the issue, 
and to have failed completely to take account of rural148 and courier pharmacies149 as 
well as the costs of compounding medicines150 in setting the dispensing fee. On the 
evidence, Ngcobo J found that ‘on the applicant’s own version, it is therefore clear that 
without an increase in such volume [of medicine dispensed], the dispensing fees adopted 
are not appropriate’151. Finally, Ngcobo J concurred with Chaskalson CJ on the issue of 
whether, having invited oral representation, the Pricing Committee was bound to 
consider it and found that: 
‘In ignoring the oral representations, the Pricing Committee ignored relevant matters 
which it was bound to take into account. The duty of the Pricing Committee was to 
apply its mind properly to all materials before it including matters at the oral 
hearings. It failed to do so when it ignored oral representations. In doing so it 
erred.’152  
4.7.3 Ultra Vires 
The doctrine of ultra vires can be seen, historically, as the bedrock of administrative law. 
The rule of law, as first described and promoted by AR Dicey, was premised on the 
requirement that each sphere of government functions, within defined and distinct 
realms, defer to each other within those areas of expertise, with the legislature being 
sovereign. It required that administrative action must be exercised within the scope of its 
147 Supra at para 534 
148 Supra at para 549  
149 Supra at para 563 
150 Supra at para 566 
151 Supra at para 548 
152 Supra at para 574 
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empowering legislation and was challengeable only on limited ultra vires grounds which 
included absurdness, vagueness or ambiguity, failure to comply with the formalities of 
the empowering legislation or being inconsistently applied153. The doctrine was premised 
on the legislature controlling the executive and being bound to express the will of the 
people. Administrative agencies gave effect to state policy by implementing legislative 
enactments and remaining within the boundaries of that empowering legislation. Under 
the common law, the review of administrative action was limited to grounds falling within 
the ultra vires doctrine, which included a jurisdictional error of law, ulterior motive, mala 
fides, vagueness, failure to apply the mind, consideration of irrelevant factors or a 
disregarding of relevant factors and gross unreasonableness. The section 6 grounds of 
review in PAJA incorporate the doctrine of ultra vires, albeit not expressly, and the 
administrator is enjoined, in a number of subsections, to act only within the provisions of 
the empowering provisions154. The obligation to act only within the boundaries of the 
empowering legislation is consequently a statutory obligation which supplants the 
common law doctrine of ultra vires. It has been argued that the doctrine exists in South 
African law only as a means of applying Constitutional principles and provisions155, which 
are, in turn, given effect by PAJA. Regardless of the status of the ultra vires doctrine, the 
courts continue to use the term. 
On the evidence, Chaskalson CJ156  found that only Regulations 22 and 23 were not 
permitted by the empowering legislation and were therefore invalid157. The Regulations 
allowed the Director-General to publish his opinion on whether the single exit price was 
unreasonable or not, notwithstanding that the single exit price would have been set in 
153 See for a general discussion, Henderson, A op cit at note 21  
154 Sections 6(2)(a)(i) and (ii); 6(2)(b); 6(2)(e)(i); 6(2)(f)(i) 
155 Henderson, A Op cit at note21 
156 Ngcobo, O’Regan and Van der Westhuizen JJ concurring 
157 Supra at para 419 
Administrative Justice:  
K. Horsley  Page 47 of 97 
                                           
terms of the regulations and would therefore be correct or intra vires. The majority of 
the Court158 did not find the single exit price to have been inappropriate as it fell within a 
range of reasonableness159, and was objective and sanctioned by the Act160 and was 
therefore intra vires.  
As can be seen from the above, a review for reasonableness and a review for 
lawfulness on the grounds of ultra vires are interwoven in the judgment and 
unfortunately, little is added to clarify the standard of review of administrative action.   
4.8 Procedural Fairness 
Having considered the reasonability and lawfulness of the recommendation of the Pricing 
Committee and the decision of the Minister, the final ground on which the Court 
reviewed the administrative action was procedural fairness.  
‘What section 3 of PAJA requires is that administrative action must be procedurally 
fair. It refers specifically to the giving of adequate notice and providing a reasonable 
opportunity to make representations, and it makes it clear that what is necessary for 
this purpose will depend on the circumstances of each case.’161
The Court found that as section 22G of the Medicines Control Act had not provided a 
procedure to be followed in setting the regulations, the minimum standards prescribed 
by section 4(1) of PAJA would apply162.  The Court also confirmed that the standards of 
fairness would differ according to the context and according to the type of administrative 
action taken. An example is that adjudicative administrative action, where individuals are 
158 Yacoob J with Moseneke, Madala, Mokgoro, Skweyiya, and Langa JJ concurring 
159 Supra at para 840 
160 Supra at para 841 
161 Supra at para 151 
162 Supra at para 150 
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affected directly by the outcome, will require a higher standard of procedural fairness163.  
In respect of legislative administrative action, the requirements of fairness would 
ordinarily be met by a notice and comment procedure164 and the process of analysing 
and considering submissions may certainly be delegated165.  
The main procedural challenge was that the oral hearings were improperly 
constituted as not all members of the Pricing committee were present at all times. The 
Court found that this standard would properly apply only to adjudicative hearings and 
that, within the boundaries of the empowering provisions, the functionary is able to 
prescribe its own procedure166. The Court found the procedure to have been fair on the 
basis that the regulations to the Act did not prescribe a quorum; the nature of the Pricing 
Committee was long term and therefore it was unlikely that all the members could be 
present at all times167; the oral submissions had resulted in changes to the 
regulations168; the oral representations, which were electronically recorded and could be 
referred to at  a later date, were not prescribed for the making of delegated legislation 
as a notice and comment procedure would suffice169. 
The judgment of Sachs J is useful in that, having found that PAJA does not apply to 
the making of delegated legislation, he provided an analysis of what procedural fairness 
would require in that context and against general Constitutional grounds. He noted that, 
historically, SA administrative law was influenced by English not American law and as 
such, as long as the regulation makers complied with whatever procedure was set in the 
163 Supra at para 153 
164 Supra at para 157 
165 Supra at para 158 
166 Supra at para 171 
167 Supra at para 172 
168 Supra at para 180 
169 Supra at para 180 and 181 
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legislation, there was no obligation to provide for public participation170. In the current 
constitutional era, government and organs of state are accountable for their conduct and 
any secret law-making at a legislative or regulatory level is an anathema. Certainly, the 
degree of public participation may vary from a requirement that deliberative bodies 
deliberate in public while non-deliberative bodies may find alternate methods of public 
involvement171. A fair procedure is an imperative for administrative justice, particularly 
with regard to South Africa’s Constitutional framework where public participation in 
government ensures not only a fair procedure but, as significantly, ensures 
accountability, transparency and openness172. Sachs J is persuasive in his argument that:  
‘It would be strange indeed if the principles of participatory democracy and 
consultation when the chain of public power began with the enactment of the original 
legislation, then vanished at the crucial stage when the general principles of the 
original statute were being converted into operational standards and procedures, only 
to re-surface at the stage of the implementation of provisions impacting on specific 
individuals … The right to speak and be listened to is part of the right to be a citizen 
in the fullest sense of the word. In a constitutional democracy dialogue and the right 
to have a voice on public affairs is constitutive of dignity’173
The issue therefore is not whether the regulatory body should allow public 
participation but how it should be provided for. Absent legislative guidance on this, when 
administrative procedures are challenged, it is left to the courts to ensure that proper 
procedure was followed in the making of subordinate legislation174. The judgment did 
not attempt to prescribe these procedures but provided insight into the factors to be 
170 Supra at para 620 
171 Supra at para 621 
172 Supra at para 625 
173 Supra at para 626 and 627 
174 Supra at para 625 
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considered. Critically, the challenge to a participative process must be balanced with the 
need for efficiency and effectiveness:  
‘…, much will depend on the setting in which the subordinate legislation is being 
adopted, the nature of the power being exercised, the purpose of the rules being 
made, the people who stand most directly to be affected and the social and economic 
context in which the measure will function. An appropriate balance will need to be 
struck between facilitating meaningful public access to the process and achieving 
economic use of time and resources. Indeed, it should be borne in mind that endless 
consultation can be as paralysing to democratic decision-making as insufficient 
consultation’ [footnotes omitted]175
Achieving the necessary balance between participation and efficiency is a familiar 
feature of all administrative actions and decisions, so much so that it is constitutionally 
recognised176.  
In the context of grievance tribunals, the direct impact for the aggrieved party may 
lead the tribunal to adopting a quasi-judicial and consequently formalistic procedure. If, 
as discussed in chapter 5.3. below, the advantages of tribunals over a judicial process 
are the relative cost effectiveness and speed and efficiency, a procedure that mimics the 
judicial process may not necessarily meet those objectives. It may be tempting for 
tribunals to adopt a quasi-judicial procedure in an attempt to avoid challenges on the 
basis of procedural fairness, but even though such a procedure may be sufficiently tried 
and tested, it is not necessarily the only method of assuring procedural fairness nor is it 
necessarily the most effective. In the context of the financial services industry, the 
grievance resolution procedure is defined in the FAIS Act and provides for methods of 
dispute resolution that do not rely solely on an adversarial model. Section 27(4) 
175 Supra at para 629 
176 Section 33(3)(c) 
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empowers the ombud for Financial Service Providers [FSP’s] with investigative powers 
and section 27(5) defines the procedural options available to the ombud. In fact, the 
ombud is directed to attempt a conciliated settlement prior to commencing a more 
formal procedure177 and is not obliged to permit legal representation as any hearing178.  
The issue of limiting legal representation at grievance tribunals is in keeping with the 
section 3(3) provisions of PAJA which provides that the administrative decision maker 
retains the discretion to permit legal representatives in ‘serious or complex cases’ if such 
representation is necessary to ‘give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative 
action’. Conversely, section 3(2)(b) provides that an aggrieved party has the right to 
make reasonable representations but this does not include a right to legal 
representation, a decision that remains within the administrator’s discretion. Even though 
the legislative intention is clear and is suggestive of a policy decision that legal 
representation can lead to an overly formalistic, adversarial, expensive and time-
consuming procedure, the courts have been reluctant to permit any rule or guideline that 
is a blanket exclusion of legal representation and permits no discretion by the presiding 
decision maker. The position was well stated by the SCA in the Hamata179 judgment: 
‘There may be administrative organs of such a nature that the issues which come 
before them are always so mundane and the consequences of their decisions for 
particular individuals always so insignificant that a domestic rule prohibiting legal 
representation would be neither unconstitutional nor be required to be “read down” 
(if its language so permits) to allow for the exercising of a discretion in that regard. 
177 Section 27(5)(b) 
178 Section 27(5)(a) 
179 Hamata & another v Chairperson, Peninsula Technikon Disciplinary Committee & others (2002) 23 ILJ  
1531 (SCA). The case involved the outcome of a disciplinary hearing for a journalism student at Pen. Tech. 
who was expelled from the institution after publishing a less than flattering article about the learning 
institution. The SCA heard the appeal from the Cape High Court. 
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On the other hand, there may be administrative organs which are faced with issues, 
and whose decisions may entail consequences, which range from the relative trivial 
to the most grave. Any rule purporting to compel such an organ to refuse legal 
representation no matter what the circumstances might be, and even of they are 
such that a refusal might very well impair the fairness of the administrative 
proceeding, cannot pass muster in law’180
It is thus left to the decision maker to determine the correct procedure to be followed 
and whether the context of the case requires the presence of legal representation and, in 
doing so, to consider issues such as the degree of factual and legal complexity, the 
seriousness of the consequencese or prejudice and the relative abilities of the parties. 
The above discussion is restricted to one small aspect of procedural fairness, being 
legal representation, and demonstrates the difficulty of establishing rules or guidelines 
that permit sufficient flexibility to allow a quicker, cheaper and more efficient grievance 
tribunal while still retaining the necessary fairness to achieve administrative justice. What 
is clear however is that the procedure is dependant on the context of each case and that 
the presiding administrative decision maker must remain alive to the exercising his/her 
discretion where it is provided for to ensure fairness and not a formalistic adherence to 
procedure. 
4.9 Classification of Functions 
In this discussion, grievance tribunals have been described as quasi-judicial in nature 
and form. The term suggests an adherence to a formalistic classification of functions. 
However, as can be seen from the following discussion, the term may still have 
applicability even while the practice of classifying administrative functions in order to 
180Ibid at para 12 
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determine the extent of the rights of the parties as well as the scope of judicial review 
has been discredited in South African jurisprudence. 
Historically, South African administrative law categorised the functions of 
administrators so as best to identify the standard of review applicable to each function. 
The purpose was partly to enable the judiciary to honour the doctrine of the separation 
of powers and therefore, depending on the nature of the function or functionary, to 
review the actions and decisions against either a limited or expansive standard of review. 
Consequently, in areas where the courts would not ordinarily consider themselves 
expert, they could defer almost entirely to the discretion of the functionary while in areas 
where the courts could apply their unique expertise, for example in adjudicative matters, 
they could apply a higher standard.  Simply put, the functions recognised by the courts 
were181: 
 Legislative administrative acts where the administrator had broad discretion. This 
category referred to the making of delegated or subordinate legislation and not 
primary legislation, being the domain of an elected legislature responsible for 
implementing executive policy. This category is characterised in part by a high 
level of discretion being afforded the administrative functionary. 
 Adjudicative administrative acts, sometimes referred to as quasi-judicial and 
related to specialised tribunals with power sourced from statute or some other 
empowering provision such as contract or a voluntary association. The nature of 
adjudicative bodies is similar to that of the judicial function and the courts have 
tended to review more strictly the decisions taken by the administrator 
 Administrative or purely administrative acts, where the administrative functionary 
is afforded limited discretion in the implementation of legislation. 
181 See for example Hoexter, C op cit at note 67 at page 28 
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This method of organising the exercise of public power can be criticised as being 
formalistic in nature as the courts were occupied with the process of categorising the 
type of power exercised and not with the substance of the matter at hand182. As Hoexter 
notes183, South African jurisprudence eventually followed its English counterpart in 
rejecting the classification of functions in favour of a general duty to act fairly regardless 
of the nature of the administrative enquiry or the identity of the administrative 
functionary184.  
As the classification of functions had been safely relegated to the annals of 
jurisprudential history, it was with some alarm that Hoexter185 considered the definition 
of ‘decision’186 in PAJA. She suggested that as the definition excluded acts of an 
executive, legislative and judicial nature, by including the phrase ‘of an administrative 
nature’ in the definition, the drafters may have been attempting to emphasise that 
executive, legislative and judicial decisions were not within the scope of the legislation. 
Alternatively, the legislature was attempting to re-introduce the classification of functions 
by limiting the scope of the Act to administrative or purely administrative acts and 
decisions and signalled a resurgence of the classification of functions. Hoexter’s objection 
to the aspect of South Africa’s common law is such that she hypothesises that reading it 
into PAJA definition would exclude legislative and judicial administrative acts and would 
therefore make the definition unconstitutional as it fails to give effect to section 33 of the 
Constitution. 
182 Ibid at page 69 
183 Ibid at page 208 
184 Administrator, Transvaal v Traub 1989 (4) SA 731 (AD) and South African Roads Board v Johannesburg 
City Council 1991 (4) SA 1 (A) 
185 Op cit at note67 at page 101 and 102 
186 Section 1(v) of Act 3 of 2000 ‘ “Decision” means any decision of an administrative nature made … under 
an empowering provision …’ 
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Hoexter’s warning seems to have been well founded. Sachs J’s judgment in New 
Clicks noted that the classification of functions had been rejected in favour of a 
distinction between administrative acts that would impact all members of the community 
and those that impact individuals but goes further to suggest that the changed nature of 
South Africa’s political landscape makes even this distinction irrelevant. He suggested 
that the requirement of consultation and notice and comment procedures in respect of 
the creation and application of subordinate legislation arises from the Constitutional 
principle of legality and not from the general duty to act fairly187. Sachs J attempted to 
incorporate some structure into an otherwise formless principle of legality by suggesting 
that: 
‘One may thus envisage a continuum ranging from pure law-making acts at one end, 
to pure administrative (adjudicative) acts at the other. All will be subject to 
constitutional control that is of both a procedural and a substantive kind. There will 
be a difference of emphasis rather than of kind, to take account of the different 
constitutional and public law values implicated at each end of the spectrum. Hybrid 
regulatory systems involving both generality (regulatory schemes) and specificity 
(adjudicative acts) could then be comfortably accommodated at appropriate places 
along the spectrum. The precise form of the hearing required in each case and the 
manner in which the substantive reasonableness will be determined, will accordingly 
depend more on the nature of the interests at stake in each particular instance than 
on the label or labels attached. In this way administrative law emerges from the 
constitutional chrysalis as an integrated body of law.’188 [emphasis added] 
His hypothesis is interesting in that it suggests a means of limiting or organising the 
scope of review available to the judiciary when reviewing administrative acts and 
decisions and may add much to the debate on the level of deference owed by the 
                                           
187 Supra at para 638 and 639 
188 Supra at para 640 
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judiciary, albeit in a formalistic manner. However, Sachs J’s suggestion remains a 
minority view and one that did not receive the support of the New Clicks bench: 
‘Nor am I persuaded that categorisation of the exercise of public power as 
adjudicative or legislative provides the criterion as to whether the exercise of the 
power in question amounts to administrative action. The trend in modern 
administrative law has been to move away from formal classification as a criterion. It 
is clear from the decisions of this Court in Fedsure and Sarfu 3 that the use of labels 
in order to determine whether the action in question is administrative or legislative is 
not helpful. Thus in Fedsure this Court held that the process may in form be 
legislative but yet administrative in substance. … It seems to me that the fruitful 
enquiry is to look at the nature and effect of the power that is being exercised.’ 
[footnotes omitted]189
5 Adjudicative or Grievance Tribunals 
5.1 Introduction 
Writing in 1993, Govender190 noted the apparent need for consideration and potentially 
rationalisation of administrative tribunals in South Africa. This proposal, based primarily 
on the Australian example and the work of the South African Law Commission191 which 
ultimately influenced the drafting of the first Administrative Justice Bill, included the need 
for a single and common or general appellate body to hear appeals from the findings of 
any administrative tribunal. The aim of such a tribunal would not only be a means of 
ensuring openness, fairness and impartiality192, but would provide a consistent 
189 Ngcobo J, Supra at para 476 
190 Govender, K ‘Administrative Appeals Tribunals’ (1993) Acta Juridica 76 
191 South African Law Commission, Working Paper 34, Project 24 55 (1991) and Project 115 (August 1999) 
192 Govender, K Op cit at 87 
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development of administrative jurisprudence which, in turn, would facilitate accessibility 
to the administrative framework as well as the predictability of administrative principles.  
Practically, an administrative tribunal structure should support one of the basic 
tenants of the doctrine of separation of powers, being to defer to the expertise and 
experience of the administrative decision maker, particularly in polycentric or complex 
matters with far reaching consequences. The concept, therefore, calls for specialisation 
within a common and consistent structure. Within the financial services industry alone, 
there are currently five different quasi-judicial statutory and voluntary adjudicative 
tribunals: 
 The ombud for banking services, a voluntary scheme  
 The short term insurance ombud, a voluntary scheme  
 The long term insurance ombud, a voluntary scheme  
 The pension funds adjudicator [PF adjudicator], empowered by Chapter VA of the 
Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 
 The ombud for FSP’s, empowered by Chapter VI, part I of the Financial Advisory 
and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002 
 The directorate for market abuse, empowered by section 83 of the Security 
Services Act 36 of 2004 
The voluntary schemes mentioned above are subject to and empowered by the 
Financial Services Ombud Schemes Act, 37 of 2004.  In addition to these bodies, the 
following regulatory and self-regulatory administrative tribunals have administrative 
powers to sanction, caution, suspend or remove any licenses to operate: 
 the Financial Services Board appeals tribunal,  empowered by section 26 of the 
Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990 
 the board of the Securities regulation panel for take-overs and mergers, 
empowered by chapter XVA of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
 the Johannesburg Securities Exchange, empowered by Chapter III of the Security 
Services Act 36 of 2004193 
193 Until the promulgation of the Security Services Act, 36 of 2004, the Johannesburg Securities Exchange 
was regulated in terms of the Stock exchange Control Act 1 of 1985 
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5.2 Jurisdiction  
Having noted the plethora of administrative tribunals and the demands of modern 
industrialised state, Govender194 notes that the granting of administrative discretion is 
inevitable. Aronson, et el summarise some of the issues surrounding discretion and the 
inter play with the doctrine of separation of powers in the following way:  
‘Public statutory power is best seen as a series of delegations: To the executive is 
delegated the tasks of policy development within the framework of the Act, the 
making of regulations and the application and enforcement of the administrative 
scheme initiated by the Act … Most traditional administrative law theorists see 
discretion as the problem of administrative law. They do not, of course, imagine that 
it can be eliminated. They recognise its inevitability in an administrative state, and 
see judicial review as part of the checks and balances needed to legitimate it. Others, 
however, see discretion as simply part of the system of delegation, being intrinsically 
neither good nor bad.’ [emphasis in original]195
The proliferation of adjudicative tribunals, within one industry, necessarily requires a 
cautious approach to jurisdiction and responsibilities, a requirement that would seem to 
be familiar in comparative jurisdictions. As Mullan states, within the context of Canadian 
administrative law: 
‘At present, uncertainty and confusion pervade much of the law governing the 
allocation of adjudicative responsibilities under many specialized justice regimes. This 
is not only the case in allocating responsibility between the regular courts and the 
administrative justice system, but also among the various components of the 
administrative justice regime.’196  
194 Op cit at note 190 at page 76 
195 Aronson, M et el  ‘Judicial Review of Administrative Action’ 3rd ed (2004) Lawbook Co, Sydney at 101 
196 Mullan, D ‘Tribunals and Courts – The Contemporary Terrain: Lessons from Human Rights Regimes’ (1998 
– 1999) 24 Queens Law Journal 643 at 644 
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The conflict of jurisdictions and statutory provisions is well illustrated in one of the 
first determinations of the ombud for FSP’s197; Dennis v Nedbank Limited198.The 
complainant received a loan from Nedbank Limited on the security of a mortgage bond 
over her immovable property. Despite the fact that the complainant was in receipt of 
homeowners insurance, Nedbank declined to take cession of this policy and, at the 
complainant’s cost, effected additional homeowners insurance as security against its 
loan. In the first instance, the ombud for Banking Services heard and dismissed the 
complaint. On advising the ombud for Banking Services that she was dissatisfied with the 
finding and would refer the matter to the ombud for FSP’s, the complainant was advised 
that the ombud for Short Term Insurance would be the correct tribunal. The ombuds for 
banking services and short term insurance are voluntary schemes while the ombud for 
FSP’s is a statutory scheme. The issue of competing jurisdictions is not provided for in 
statute and therefore, as the complaint related to the provision of a financial services 
product as defined in section 1 of FAIS the ombud for FSP’s was able to find jurisdiction 
in the matter and rehear the complaint199.  The case is a good illustration of the 
uncertainty, inconsistency and inefficiency that can result from competing but not 
exclusive jurisdictions between grievance tribunals. The issue of competing jurisdictions 
was not the result of an unfortunate oversight by the legislature. The issue was known 
to the regulator prior to the promulgation of the FAIS legislation and as early as 1993: 
‘One cause for concern remains the repositioning of the office vis-à-vis the Financial 
Services Board (FSB) and the newly created Financial Advisory and Intermediary 
Services (FAIS) ombud. It is no trade secret that there was a stand-off during Judge 
197 The Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act took effect from 30 October 2004 and the office of 
the ombud for FSP’s has been in operation since 2005 
198 H A Dennis v Nedbank Group Insurance Brokers and Nedbank Limited Case Number FOC 979/05 decided 
21 July 2005 (office of the ombud for FSP’s) 
199 Ibid at para 20 
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Steyn’s regime [ombud for Long Term Insurance] between the office and the FSB 
over the jurisdictional divide between it and the FAIS ombud.’200
The report describes a series of workshops between industry and the regulator 
designed to resolve the jurisdictional divide. It is unclear why the resultant proposals did 
not receive consideration by the legislature. 
Having founded his jurisdiction, the ombud for FSP’s considered section 43(1) of the 
Short Term Insurance Act which provides consumers with free choice in regard to 
selecting their short-term underwriter201. This section is, however, subject to section 
43(5)(a) which reads in its entirety: 
‘Subsection (1) shall not apply in the case of a short-term policy which is required to 
be made available in relation to a contract in terms of which money is loaned upon 
the security of the mortgage of immovable property.’  
Despite the apparent clarity of the section, the ombud found that:  
‘In my view, the legislature could never have intended such a consequence. What 
was intended, in my view, is that the creditor and the debtor … would have to ensure 
that the security that is provided in terms of the policy or policy benefits is 
appropriate to protect the interests of the creditor… My view is supported by the 
various respects in which the conduct of the 1st Respondent in placing, as it does, 
reliance on Section 43(5)(a) of the STO Act would be both inconsistent and 
irreconcilable with the provisions of the FAIS Act’202  
200 2003 Annual Report ombudsman, at page 3 www.ombud.co.za accessed 3 January 2006  
201 ‘Free choice in certain circumstances.—(1)  Subject to subsection (5), if a party to a contract in terms of 
which money is loaned, goods are leased or credit is granted, requires, … shall be entitled, and shall be 
given prior written notification of that entitlement, to a free choice— 
(a) as to whether he or she wishes to enter into a new policy and make it available for that 
purpose, or wishes to make available an existing policy of the appropriate value for that purpose, or 
wishes to utilise a combination of those options;’ 
202 Supra at para 23 
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The ombud found that as the FAIS Act entitled consumers to make informed 
decisions, they are also entitled to free choice203 and relies on section 16(1) of the FAIS 
Act to make this finding. Section 16(1) is concerned with the manner and form of the 
Codes of Conduct to be drafted and published by the Regulator:  
‘A code of conduct must be drafted in such a manner as to ensure that clients being 
rendered financial services will be able to make informed decisions, that their 
reasonable financial needs regarding financial products will be appropriately …’.  
The ombud therefore relies on the General Code of Conduct204 or administrative 
rules, and not a statutory provision to overturn the legislative provisions of the Short 
Term Insurance Act, an Act not within his jurisdiction.  
Leaving aside for the moment the question of whether or not the ombud for FSP’s 
was sufficiently empowered, as an adjudicative tribunal tasked with the enforcement of 
the FAIS Act only, to dismiss the provisions of the Short Term Insurance Act on the basis 
that the provisions pre-dated those of FAIS and where inconsistent with it205, and 
consequently whether the ombud was acting ultra vires, the conflict between 
jurisdictions is clear. It is submitted that the number of adjudicative decision making 
bodies with jurisdictional conflicts as well as the absence of an over-arching, single 
appellate tribunal has the potential for contradictory and inconsistent administrative 
decision making. Moreover, time and cost efficiency is necessarily compromised and 
certainty for the parties cannot easily be provided in a structure that allows and, it would 
seem from the Dennis v Nedbank judgment, encourages “forum shopping” by 
complainants.  
203 Supra at para 33 
204 Published by the Financial Services Board, in terms of Board Notice 80 of 2003 (effective 30 October 
2004) 
205 Supra at para 40 
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In respect of the tribunals under review in this paper, the empowering legislation has 
not attempted to oust the jurisdiction of the High Court, even though precedence does 
exist in the labour law context206. Certainty and speedy finality has been sacrificed in 
favour of an inherent High Court jurisdiction. In the Canadian human rights context, 
Mullan notes that even when the legislature has attempted to create exclusive 
jurisdiction for grievance tribunals, the courts have been loathe to defer to it207, a 
phenomenon shared in the South African experience.208  
5.3 The case for an administrative appeals tribunal 
Even though the concept of a general administrative appeals tribunal has not been 
implemented in the South African administrative law framework, it remains useful to 
consider the Australian experience. The Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal [AAT] 
has been in operation since 1976209. In considering the different options of a generalist 
tribunal as opposed to a series of specialist tribunals, Creyke notes that: 
‘The biggest criticism of tribunal systems composed solely of specialist tribunals is 
that their tribunals have been developed in a haphazard fashion. The result is that 
there is no consistent pattern of decisions which are reviewable, and no common 
procedures, making it difficulty for citizens bringing claims and those who appear 
before the. Other criticisms are that they duplicate resources, premises and 
206 Section 157 of the Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995 
207 Mullan, D ‘Tribunals and Courts – The Contemporary Terrain: Lessons from Human Rights Regimes’ (1998 
– 1999) 24 Queens Law Journal 643 at 653 
208 See Fedlife Assurance Limited v Wolfaardt (2001) 12 BLLR 1301 (SCA) where the Supreme Court of 
Appeal rejected the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Appeal Court in matters relating to the employment 
contract, finding that fixed term contracts could be governed not by labour legislation but by the common 
law of contract. The effect of the judgment is two fold: (1) to subordinate the Labour Appeal Court to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal and (2) to create, albeit in limited circumstances, dual jurisdictions 
209 Creyke, R ‘Tribunals and Access to Justice’ (2002) 2 Queensland University T.L. & J Journal  65 
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infrastructure, and are generally an inefficient way to administer administrative 
justice’210. 
Creyke notes that the arguments in favour of a single, general tribunal system were 
restated in the UK’s 2001 Leggatt report211: 
 ‘The important place which tribunals now play in the modern system of administrative 
law would best be recognised by forming them into a coherent system to sit 
alongside the ordinary courts 
 The overriding aim should be to present citizens with a single, overarching structure. 
It would be accessible to all tribunals. Any citizen who wished to appeal a tribunal 
would only have to submit the appeal, confident in the knowledge that one system 
handling all such disputes, and could be relied upon to allocate it to the right tribunal. 
This would be a considerable advance in clarity and simplicity for users and their 
advisers. The single system would enable a coherent, user-focused approach to the 
provision of information which would enable tribunals to meet the claim that they 
operate in ways which would enable citizens to participate directly in preparing and 
presenting their own cases. 
 Tribunals should do all they can to render themselves understandable, unthreatening, 
and useful to users, who should be able to obtain all the information they need about 
venues, timetables, and sources of professional advice’ from a single source. 
 The procedural reform of formal dispute resolution processes, in courts and tribunals, 
involves a distinctive and common set of issues … [L]eaving procedural reform of 
tribunals scattered across a series of departments is impeding modernisation.’ 
It is not my aim to add to the many and far superior calls for a single administrative 
appeals tribunal in South Africa, but rather to submit that, if the financial services 
210 Ibid at 69 
211 Leggatt, A Tribunals for Users One System, One Service: Report of the Review of Tribunals (2001) as 
quoted in Creyke Ibid at 69  
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industry is used as an example of how industry specific adjudicative tribunals have 
developed in South Africa, any proposals for change should include a rationalisation and 
consolidation of these industry bodies.  
The Australian AAT is an overarching structure that has a wide ranging jurisdiction 
and a resolution based approach to dispute settlement that includes mediation and 
conciliation as well as adversarial hearings212. Like the South African Constitution213, the 
Australian Commonwealth Constitution provides the courts with an inherent jurisdiction, 
which cannot be ousted, over all legal disputes including the findings of adjudicative 
tribunals214. This over-sight or supervisory role of the judiciary has required not only the 
establishment of an appropriate standard of review but also one which is capable of 
handling the alternate dispute resolution procedures that may be employed by 
adjudicative tribunals. One of the criticisms laid at the door of judicial review of 
adjudicative decisions is that the right to access the common law courts with their 
adversarial nature can influence tribunals to a more formalistic, legalistic or procedural 
process that ignores the inherent cost and efficiency advantages of less formal 
procedures such as mediation, arbitration or conciliation. As one of the primary 
arguments in favour of tribunals concerned with the implementation of government 
policy and the application of legislative rules, is that being functionaries within the 
government infrastructure, they are able to apply government policy. This begs the 
question however of how slavishly such tribunals should apply government policy. 
212 At 1993, a jurisdiction of approximately 200 statutory instruments ranging from taxation, veteran affairs, 
social welfare, refugee status, student affairs and wildlife protection. See Saunders, C ‘Appeal or Review: 
The Experience of Administrative Appeals in Australia’ (1993) Acta Juridica 88 at 89 
213 Section 34 of Act 108 of 1996 
214 Saunders, C ‘Appeal or Review: The Experience of Administrative Appeals in Australia’ (1993) Acta 
Juridica 88 at 91 
Administrative Justice:  
K. Horsley  Page 65 of 97 
                                           
Saunders215 notes that this debate required an internal solution within the AAT itself such 
that the tribunal honoured the Federal Court injunction to apply independent judgment 
over government policy216 while recognising the importance of consistent decision 
making. The solution is that policies that have been subject to parliamentary evaluation 
are not generally departed from. Saunders notes that this has led to an increase in those 
administrative policies that receive parliamentary scrutiny, a practice, it is submitted, that 
would be welcome in the South African context. 
6 Financial services tribunals as ‘organs of state’ 
6.1. Introduction 
An analysis of the statutes that empower grievance tribunals in the financial services 
industry highlights the need for legislative consistency in respect of whether a 
dissatisfied participant may appeal a tribunal determination, in the widest sense, or 
whether the remedy should be restricted to a review process. 
The three tribunals that will be reviewed in this section are the ombud for Financial 
Services Providers217, the Pension Funds Adjudicator218 and the Directorate for Market 
Abuses219. The ombud for FSP’s and the PF adjudicator are adjudicative bodies that are 
empowered to hear and determine on complaints received in respect of pension fund 
215 Ibid at 96 
216 Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 2 ALD 60 quoted by Saunders, Ibid at 95 
217 Chapter VI, part I of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002 
218 Chapter VA of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956Hereinafter, the PF adjudicator 
219 Section 83 of the Security Services Act 36 of 2004. Prior to 2004, the Directorate for Insider Trading 
empowered by the Insider Trading Act 135 of 1998 
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organisations and financial services providers220. Both statutes provide for an alternate 
dispute resolution procedure and for the creation and function of the tribunals. The 
Directorate for Market Abuses, conversely, is empowered by statute to investigate 
suspected market abuse events and to sue in civil law on behalf of any prejudiced 
parties. The question posed in this section is whether these tribunals are subject to 
administrative justice principles, with specific reference to judicial review. 
6.2. Administrative Action in PAJA and the Constitutional 
Court 
Administrative action is defined in PAJA221 as meaning  
‘any decision taken, or failure to take a decision, by- 
(a) an organ of state, when- 
(i) exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial constitution; or 
(ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any 
legislation; or 
(b) a natural or juristic person, other than an organ of state, when exercising a public 
power of performing a public function in terms of an empowering provision’ 
In terms of subsection (a)(ii) of the definition, as Plasket points out, the terms ‘public 
power’ and ‘public function’ are linked to ‘legislation’ and, consequently, it is only a 
creature of statute that can be considered an organ of state. A voluntary body would 
therefore not be considered an organ of state and any administrative law challenge to 
220 Financial services are defined in FAIS as including any body that administers, provides or manages, inter 
alia, insurance and investment products and therefore includes insurers, investment managers, collective 
investment scheme managers (unit trust companies), banks, stock brokers, insurance agents or brokers 
221 Section 1 
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such a body would need to be in terms of subsection (b) of the definition of 
‘administrative action’222. 
In the Sarfu223 case, the Constitutional Court recognised that determining whether 
action is administrative in nature or not rests not on who is exercising the public power 
but on the nature of the power exercised. The Court distinguished between the 
implementation of legislation, which would ordinarily be administrative action, and 
setting policy that would not be administrative action and used the following factors as a 
determinate: 
 the nature of the power being exercised. Implementation of legislation is 
definitely administrative in nature which is justiciable while setting policy is 
executive in nature and is not justiciable 
 the source of the power 
 the subject matter of the power  
6.3 Exercising Public Power 
The test to determine whether a statutory body is indeed an organ of state has not been 
finally settled by the courts. Plasket224 analyses the various standards applied and notes 
three trends: 
 The broad reasoning applied in Baloro v University of Bophutatswana225 which 
recognised the need to apply administrative justice principles to the exercise of  
purely private power 
222 Plasket, C ‘The Fundamental Right to Just Administrative Action: Judicial Review of Administrative Action 
in the Democratic South Africa’ (2002) Doctoral Thesis, University of Rhodes 
223 President of RSA and Others v SARFU and Others 1999 (10) BCLR 1059 (CC) at para 141 
224 Plasket, C op cit at note222 at page 115 
225 1995 (8) BCLR 1018 (B) 
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 A narrower interpretation as applied in Directory Advertising Cost Cutters226 and 
Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council of South Africa227 where the 
courts applied a strict control test, finding that organs of state are limited to 
those institutions within the government infrastructure or where the institutions 
are controlled by the state. In Mistry the Court found that although the 
respondent was created by statute and held search and investigative powers, 
arguably ‘public powers’, the fact that the Minister did not appoint all the 
councillors, it was financed by fees charged to the profession and that it 
employed staff who were not state employees meant that it was not an organ of 
state 
 A ‘benevolent control test’228 as applied in Esack v Commission on Gender 
Equality229 where the control test was acknowledged but the Court applied 
flexibly such that a body could be subject to the control of the state without 
being within the state infrastructure. Further, the statutory independence of the 
body did not detract from the state’s ability to direct the function of that body. 
Significantly, the Court found that the gender equality commission performed a 
function that was in the public interest and in terms of state imperatives.  
The English courts, applied the “public function” test in the Datafin case230 in which it 
was found that the Panel had exercised a public power even though it was not a 
government agency nor was it created by statute. The court found that had the Panel 
226 Directory Advertising Cost Cutters v Minister of Posts, Telecommunications and Broadcasting 1996 (3) SA 
800 (T) 
227 Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council of South Africa 1997 (7) BCLR 933 (D) 
228 Plasket, C op cit at note222 at page 119 
229 (2000) 21 ILJ 467 (W) 
230  R v Panel on Take-overs and mergers; Ex parte Datafin plc (1987) 1 QB 815 in Aronson, M et el  
‘Judicial Review of Administrative Action’ 3rd ed (2004) at page 118 
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not existed, the function would have needed to be performed by government and, 
further, that even though the power exercised was economic in nature and not legal, 
that ‘power behind the scenes is power nonetheless’231. 
The South African courts were equally prepared to review the decisions of a non-
government body exercising public power in the Dawnlaan Beleggings case232 where the 
Court found that the securities exchange had a duty to act in the public interest.  
The approach taken in both cases has been criticised. Aronson, et el submits:  
‘… that it is untenable to test a function’s amenability to judicial review by speculation 
(or even hard evidence) as to what government would have done if the non-
governmental body had not performed the function. Government intentions are hard 
to ascertain, rarely fixed, and not always directly or immediately translated into 
legislation.’ 233
Regardless of the criticisms, the principle enunciated in these cases is reflected in 
subsection (b) of the definition of ‘administrative action’ in PAJA. As will be seen from the 
discussion in chapter 8 below, the potential for judicial review of private industry specific 
adjudicatory tribunals has not been directly addressed by the courts since the 
promulgation of PAJA, but it is clear that the definition of ‘administrative action’ has 
opened the door to such review.  
In the event that subsection (b) is read down by the courts and the nature of the 
power exercised would not be considered sufficiently public so as to warrant 
administrative review, it is submitted that both the PF adjudicator and the ombud for 
FSP’s nevertheless fall within the definition of ‘organs of state’ for the reasons set out 
below. 
231 Ibid 
232 Dawnlaans Beleggings (Edms) Bpk v Johannesburg Stock Exchange 1983 (3) SA 344 (W) discussed in 
Hoexter, C ‘The New Constitutional and Administrative Law’ Vol 2 (Juta, 2002) at page 99 
233 Aronson, M et el  ‘Judicial Review of Administrative Action’ 3rd ed (2004) at page 119 
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Section 21 of FAIS234 provides that the board (Financial Services Board235) is 
responsible for the appointment of the ombud and deputy ombud and is empowered to 
dismiss both incumbents, on good cause. The FSB is the primary regulator for all 
financial services providers and is accountable to the Minister of Finance and financed by 
levies from the industry236.  
Section 22 provides that funding for the office of the ombud is provided by the FSB 
and section 23(3) provides that the records and financial statement must be audited by 
the Auditor-General. 
Finally, section 26(1) empowers the FSB to make and publish the rules regulating the 
procedure, jurisdiction, scope of the ombud and ‘liaison between the ombud and the 
registrar, and administrative duties of these functionaries regarding mutual 
administrative support, exchange of information and reports, .. and avoidance of 
overlapping of their respective functions’237. Section 26(2)(a) provides that the Board 
must ‘ensure that no rule made under subsection (1) detracts or affects the 
independence of the ombud in any material way’ . This last is critical to the integrity and 
independence of the ombud but should not be read to mean that the ombud is not an 
organ of state, exercising a public power. This position is supported by Esack v 
Commission on Gender Equality238.  
Similarly, section 30C of the Pension Funds Act239 provides for the appointment and 
removal of the PF adjudicator by the Minister of Finance. Section 30R provides that 
234 Act 37 of 2002 
235 Hereinafter FSB 
236 Section 15A of the Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990 
237 Supra section 26(1)(c) 
238 Supra at note229  
239 Act 24 of 1956 
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funding for the office of the ombud is provided by the FSB and section 30T provides that 
the records and financial statement must be audited by the Auditor-General.  
The assertion that administrative justice principles should be applied to the 
functioning and determinations of both the ombud for FSP’s and the PF adjudicator can 
be challenged on the basis that although both functionaries are statutory bodies, they 
are not necessarily organs of state as they do not function within the traditional 
government infrastructure. In fact, both statutes provide that the tribunals enjoy a level 
of independence from the department and Minister of Finance. It is submitted however 
that both tribunals function as regulatory bodies, are ultimately responsible to the state 
and are exercising power that is public in nature. Both are directed to fulfil the policy 
imperative of emphasising the protection of the public rather than the promotion of self 
or sectoral self interests240. In the alternate, the principles of administrative justice can 
be said to apply by virtue of subsection (b) of the PAJA definition of ‘administrative 
action’ that specifically provides for private bodies exercising public power.  
7 Appeal or Review within financial services 
adjudicatory tribunals 
7.1 The Pension Funds Adjudicator 
Section 30P of the Pension Fund Act 24 of 1956 states: 
1) ‘Any party who feels aggrieved by a determination of the adjudicator may, within six 
weeks after the date of the determination, apply to the division of the Supreme Court 
which has jurisdiction, for relief … 
240 Section 30D of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 and section 20(3) of the Financial Advisors and 
Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002 
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2) The division of the Supreme Court contemplated in subsection (1) shall have the 
power to consider the merits of the complaint in question, to take evidence and to 
make any order it deems fit’  
In the De Beer241 case, an appeal from the determination of the PF adjudicator, 
Davis J refers to the Supreme Court of Appeal decision of Meyer v Iscor Pension Fund   
‘From the wording of s30P(2) it is clear that the appeal to the High Court 
contemplated is an appeal in the wide sense. The High Court is therefore not limited 
to a decision whether the Pension Fund Adjudicator’s determination is right or wrong. 
Neither is it confined to the evidence of the grounds upon which the Pension Fund 
Adjudicator’s decision was based. The Court can consider the matter afresh and make 
any order it deems fit. At the same time, however, the High Court’s jurisdiction is 
limited by s30P(2) to a consideration of “merits of the complaint in question”. The 
dispute submitted to the High Court for adjudication must therefore still be a 
“complaint” as defined.’242
It is submitted that although the legislation clearly intended that an aggrieved party 
can appeal the decision of the PF adjudicator, it also constrained the nature of the 
appeal. The resultant hybrid does nothing to advance the effective use and application of 
industry specific tribunals. The High Court is still called upon to find on the determination 
made at the tribunal but is not constrained by a call to deference:  
‘To confirm first respondent’s determination, it is necessary to find, on the evidence, 
that there was no reasonable basis for the reduced benefits received by second 
respondent…however …I do not consider that the available evidence justifies the 
conclusion reached by first respondent.’243
241 Central Retirement Annuity Fund v PF Adjudicator of Pension Fund, F E de Beer and Others Case Number 
3404/05 decided 20 October 2005 (C) at page 11 
242 (2001) SCA case number: 391/2001 (judgment delivered 20/11/2002) at page 8 
243 Supra at note 241 at page 20 
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7.2 Ombud for FSP’s 
The remedy differs in respect of disputes before the ombud, created by s20 of the FAIS 
Act244. Determinations by the ombud may be appealed internally to the Financial Services 
Board of Appeal245 and only with the leave of the ombud or permission from that Board 
of Appeal246. Determinations from both the ombud and the Board of Appeal have the 
same force and effect as a judgment from the common law courts and awards247. The 
statutory provision excludes a direct appeal or review to the common law courts and this 
section would seem to provide for the internal remedy envisaged by section 7(1) of 
PAJA. Although not explicit in the legislation, it is submitted that the decisions of the FSB 
Appeal Board would be capable of being taken on review, in terms of PAJA, and not 
appealed to the common law courts.  
7.3 Directorate for Market Abuses 
Although the Directorate functions within the financial services arena, it does differ 
markedly from its fellow adjudicative tribunals in that the empowering statute is clear 
that it does not fulfil an administrative function. Section 83(1)(c) states that the 
Directorate is empowered to investigate any suspected offences and to institute civil 
proceedings against people or bodies contravening the Act. Section 83(1)(d) states that 
‘The directorate is not intended to act as an administrative body when exercising its 
powers referred to in paragraph (c)’. The Directorate is responsible for the investigation 
and prevention of abuses such as insider trading, market manipulation, front running, 
244 Act 37 of 2002 
245 The function and procedure of this body is provided for in section 26 of the Financial Services Board Act 
97 of 1990 
246 Act 37 of 2002 S28(5) 
247 Ibid s28(4) 
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and price setting248. The offences in the legislation range from criminal, where the 
Directorate hands over its investigative findings to the prosecuting authorities for 
prosecution in the High Court249, and civil sanctions in the form of fines against the 
offending party.  
The Directorate has very wide ranging investigative powers including search and 
seizure powers250, it is appointed by and accountable to the Minister of Finance251 and is 
financed by the Financial Services Board252. The directorate is critical to South Africa’s 
economic well being as it is charged with maintaining an efficient and fair trading 
market, a function that is clearly public in nature and, absent the Directorate, would 
surely fall to the state. The impact of investigations and fines imposed by the Directorate 
on individuals and institutions is significant. The legislative intent however is clear in that 
administrative review is excluded however section 83(1)(d) has not been tested in the 
courts since the promulgation of PAJA.  
Like the PF adjudicator and the ombud for FSP’s, the Directorate for market abuses is 
used as an example of the inconsistency of legislative treatment of adjudicatory tribunals 
functioning within the financial services industry.  
7.4 Seeking consistency 
None of the three adjudicative tribunals are defined as organs of state by the 
empowering legislation and it is consequently an issue for interpretation. Using the test 
applied in Mistry253, in all three instances, the bodies are created in statute, are 
248 Section 75 of the Security Services Act, 36 of 2004 
249 Ibid section 79  
250 Ibid section 82(1) 
251 Ibid section 83(1) 
252 Ibid section 84 
253 Supra at note 227 
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accountable to the Minister of Finance, are staffed in part by government appointees and 
the internal rules are subject to consultation or approval by the Minister. On the other 
hand, they are financed by levies charged to the industry and do not receive a budgetary 
allocation from Department of Treasury and they employ staff not appointed by the 
state. It is submitted, however, that the Court in Mistry focussed not on the nature of 
the power exercised, being disciplinary and regulatory powers as well as serving the 
public interest, but rather on the nature of the functionary and whether it could be 
contained within the state infrastructure. In my view, a broader interpretation is 
preferred where a consideration of the nature of the power is favoured over a 
consideration of where the adjudicative body fits into the state infrastructure. 
It is submitted that the judicial review provided for in section 28 of FAIS should be 
preferred to the appeal provisions in the Pension Funds Act.  As Mullan notes: 
‘Allowing the tribunal first crack at the determination of issues … has a number of 
positive virtues. The courts’ judicial review or appellate role may be better informed 
by an appreciation of the view of the tribunal operating daily in the relevant field. On 
matters where the standard is patent unreasonableness or even reasonableness, this 
is a logical imperative. However, it may apply to cases where the issue is one on 
which the standard of review is correctness. Just because the tribunal is required to 
be correct does not mean that it cannot assist in the court’s understanding of the 
issue254. Also, putting together the relevant factual record may be done more cheaply 
and efficiently by the tribunal.’255
254 The Canadian practice of retaining two standards of review dependant on the nature of the administrative 
decision is not directly relevant to this paper. It is the advantages to both the judicial and the administrative 
regime of excluding the common law court jurisdiction as a primary recourse that are of interest. 
255 Mullan, D ‘Tribunals and Courts – The Contemporary Terrain: Lessons from Human Rights Regimes’ (1998 
– 1999) 24 Queens Law Journal 643 at 660 
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The growth of industry specific adjudicative tribunals is partly attributable to the 
inherent difficulties with the adversarial judicial process and the integrity and 
effectiveness of industry specific tribunals remains dependent on: 
1. the courts recognising and respecting the expertise and experience of that 
decision maker and thus restricting their enquiry to a review for lawfulness and 
reasonableness 
2. the cost and accessibility advantages of a tribunal structure being retained in the 
internal remedy process 
3. a review process that will encourage or, indeed, force the adjudicatory bodies to 
better decision making in that the review is of the decision maker’s application of 
administrative justice principles. In an appeal process, where additional facts and 
evidence can be introduced, while the finding of the courts may differ from that 
of the adjudicatory decision maker, that finding can be defended as being on the 
basis of additional facts  
4. the participants retaining their confidence in a tribunal process  
5. a tribunal structure that encourages or demands an internal appeals process prior 
to seeking recourse in the common law courts does not fully respond to the 
challenges inherent to judicial review, discussed at chapter 3, above, but does 
provide a partial alternate.  
Following Hoexter’s256 call for the minimisation of judicial review (however unlikely 
that may be) in favour of seeking integration and an appropriate role for judicial review, 
it is submitted that judicial review as the final remedy is preferable to judicial appeal at 
an earlier stage. It provides the balance needed to allow an effective and efficient 
adjudicative process and a limitation of the recourse available to the judicial process 
256 Op cit note13  at page 493 
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while retaining the fail-safe protection against decisions that are inconsistent with the 
principles of administrative justice.  
8 The De Beer case257 
It is argued above that consistency of treatment is required in the application of 
administrative justice principles to adjudicative tribunals in the financial services industry. 
Further, it is argued that the integrity of these tribunals would be better provided for if 
the legislature provided for judicial review and not judicial appeal. The statutory 
framework regulating the financial services industry was dramatically overhauled in 2003 
and 2004258. It is with regret that the legislature did not take the opportunity to provide 
an overarching adjudicative regime that supports administrative justice principles. This 
argument is not based solely on the practical need for consistency of treatment within 
one industry but also on the theoretical advantages of maintaining a separation of 
powers between the state and the judiciary, the requirements of deference to the 
industry experts and, importantly, the need for better administrative decisions. At the 
time of writing, since the promulgation of PAJA and since the legislative changes 
mentioned above, only one adjudicative decision has been decided by the High Court, 
being the De Beer case. The case is intriguing for a number of reasons: 
257 F E De Beer v Central Retirement Annuity Fund and Sanlam Life Insurance Limited Case Number 
PFA/KZN/1357/2002/KM decided 15 March 2005 (Office of the PF adjudicator) and Central Retirement 
Annuity Fund v PF Adjudicator of Pension Fund, F E de Beer and Others Case Number 3404/05 decided 20 
October 2005 (C)  
258 Inter alia, the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, 37 of 2000 was promulgated in October 
2004; the Financial Services Ombud Schemes Act 37 of 2004; the Security Services Act 36 of 2004 replaced 
the Insider Trading Act 135 of 1998, the Stock Exchange Control Act 1 of 1985 and the Financial Markets 
Control Act, 55 of 1989 
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1. The High Court was clear that, due to the statutory provisions of the Pension 
Fund Act required the matter to be taken on appeal and not review. However, the 
High Court judgment is concerned exclusively with a review of the PF 
adjudicator’s determination. In the conclusion the Court states: ‘I do not consider 
the available evidence justifies the conclusion reached by first respondent [PF 
adjudicator]’259.   
2. The finding over-turns the PF adjudicator’s decision but is based on the factual 
and legal aspects of his determination and therefore does not provide direction 
for better decision making in the future. 
3. The High Court confirms that the management committees of pension funds are 
subject to the ‘abstract values such as values of good faith, reasonableness and 
fairness’260 [emphasis added]  
and that: 
‘Applying this approach to the present dispute, the provisions of the Act read 
together with the Rules of applicant, should be construed to promote principles of 
transparency, accountability and fairness to be implemented by the management 
committee of applicant in a manner which seeks to promote the objects of the fund 
as defined.’261
The PF adjudicator is therefore enjoined to hold parties to a dispute to 
reasonableness standard. The management committee of the pension fund is itself 
subject to administrative principles and yet the PF adjudicator’s determination is not 
reviewable on administrative principles. 
                                           
259 Ibid at page 20 
260 Ibid at page 15 
261 Ibid 
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What follows is an analysis of the PF adjudicator’s determination and the High Court 
decision with a view to demonstrating that the current legislative regime fails in not 
providing space and opportunity for the courts to guide better decision making or retain 
a deferential position towards industry specific tribunals.  
8.1 Lawfulness: Reasonable Apprehension of Bias 
The common law rule against bias is based on the principle that justice must not only be 
done but be seen to be done262 as well as the need for the parties subject to an 
administrative decision to receive a fair hearing and therefore for a better decision to be 
made. The rule against bias has been codified and can be found in section 6(2)(a)(iii) of 
PAJA which states that a decision may be subject to judicial review is the administrator 
‘… was biased or reasonably suspected of bias’.  
The rule against bias should not be mistaken for the rule against ulterior purpose or 
motive, although there is much common ground between the two, which provides that 
administrative functionaries are bound to act in terms of the purposes in terms of which 
the power was granted. Purpose and motive can be distinguished by noting that 
‘purpose’ relates to the stated aim of the administrator and ‘motive’ relates to the actual 
but hidden aim263. As Hoexter illustrates, the South African courts have been loathe to 
overturn the decisions of an administrator where an ulterior motive is evidenced on the 
basis that as long as the administrator is so empowered and the power was used for the 
purpose it was intended, the motive is irrelevant264. Regardless, PAJA has included 
ulterior purpose or motive as a ground of review265. 
262 Hoexter, C ‘Administrative Justice and Dishonesty’ (1994) 111 SALJ  700 at page 711 
263 Ibid at page 703 
264 Op cit at note262 at page 705 
265 Section 6(1)(2)(e)(ii) 
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The test for bias is that a ‘reasonable suspicion’ of bias, objectively determined, 
exists, which was decided in the BTR Industries266 case where protracted labour 
negotiations led to a conciliation agreement by the Industrial Court267. The presiding 
official was charged by the Union (MAWU) with bias as a result of him delivering a talk at 
an unrelated conference organised and for the benefit of BTR’s legal advisors. The 
Appellate Division confirmed that the Union was not obliged to show that actual bias 
existed nor that there was a real likelihood of bias but rather that ‘… reasonably to 
create an impression of a leaning or inclination on his [the presiding officer’s] part 
towards one side in the dispute’268 and, in so finding, confirmed that a reasonable 
suspicion of bias was sufficient for the finding to be reviewed and overturned.  
In the De Beer case, the issue of costs charged by the Applicant was critical to both 
the PF adjudicator’s determination and the High Court’s overturning of that 
determination. The High Court found that  
‘First respondent placed considerable emphasis on an increase in costs and, in 
particular, that between 1 November 1987 and 1 November 2002 the portion of the 
second respondent’s total contribution to the fund was R50,368 whereas the total 
amount of costs amounted to R11,782. What appears to have been omitted from 
consideration is the analysis that, of the amount of R11,782 R8,523 constitutes a risk 
premium from rider benefits and life and disability cover; that is the cost of additional 
cover for risks provided by Sanlam Life for the benefit of second respondent. The 
riders formed part of the initial contract and this of the agreement entered into 
266 BTR Industries South Africa (Pty) Ltd and others v Metal and Allied Worker’s Union and another 1992(3) 
SA 482 A 
267 Now, Labour Court 
268 Supra at note 266 at page 689 G 
Administrative Justice:  
K. Horsley  Page 81 of 97 
                                           
between second respondent and applicant. Only R3,259 of the R11,782 constituted 
policy fees and administration costs; … which constitutes 4% of the maturity value’269  
It is harmful to the integrity of an industry specific tribunal when an error occurs in 
respect of the factual merits of the case. The motivation for tribunals of this nature is in 
part the expertise of the decision maker in regard to the industry over which it has 
jurisdiction and is critical to the ongoing success of such adjudicative tribunals. One 
explanation for the PF adjudicator’s incomplete analysis of the contractual arrangement 
between the parties could be explained by a consideration of the PF adjudicator’s 
opening remarks:    
‘The facts of the case demonstrate a truly disturbing practice in the South African 
retirement industry, especially if regard is had to a widely held view that less than 
10% of South Africans of vocational age have wholly adequate retirement provision. 
It would seem that those who try to make adequate provision for their retirement 
through retirement annuity funds are mulcted in costs that erode the very nest egg 
such funds are supposed to preserve and grow for their members. What is of even 
greater concern is that these costs are generally not disclosed to members at the 
time of signing up, nor are they disclosed with some degree of precision in the 
schedule or terms and conditions document that usually follows a member’s signing 
up’270
It is submitted that the PF adjudicator approached the case with a previously held 
and negative general view of the retirement industry as regard costs, going so far as to 
call for regulation on the matter271, which jaundiced his analysis of the specific facts. In 
so doing he failed to take account of the fact that the second respondent had not 
269 Supra at page 19 
270 Supra at para 1 
271 Supra at para 2 
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contracted with the applicant in respect of an investment only but had received death 
benefits and disability (“rider”) benefits for which premiums had been charged. 
8.2 Lawfulness: Irrelevant considerations taken into 
account 
Section 6(2)(e)(iii) of PAJA states that an administrative decision may be subject to 
judicial review if ‘… the action was taken- … because irrelevant considerations were 
taken into account or relevant considerations were not considered’272. 
In considering the role of the management board of the applicant (“the trustees” or 
“management committee”), the PF adjudicator found that the board had been derelict in 
its fiduciary duties when it failed to challenge the assumptions made by Sanlam Life 
Assurance Limited when it calculated the projected or illustrative retirement values when 
issuing the policy contract. At paragraph 18 and in support of this contention,  
‘Perhaps the lack of vigilance on the part of the management board or Sanlam should 
come as no surprise since the Sanlam document273 still (more than 10 years since the 
birth of our constitutional democracy that outlaws retribution by death) contains a 
clause that excludes liability for payment of a death benefit where the death happens 
“as a result of the execution of the death sentence on account of an offence …”. The 
death sentence has not been a part of our existence in South Africa since the Interim 
Constitution enshrined the right to life in 1993 and the Constitutional Court upheld 
that right in strong and decisive terms in S v Makwenya 1995(3) SA 391 (CC). That 
272 Incidentally, it is submitted that the sentence structure of this section does not add to its clarity. Nothing 
particular turns on it but the section would be better suited by the word ‘because’ being replaced by ‘and’. 
De Ville op cit at note25 at page 181 suggests that the term ‘because’ implies that the relevant or irrelevant 
factors are sufficiently material to have caused a defect in the outcome or decision  
273 (the policy of insurance entered into between the applicant and Sanlam Life Assurance Limited in respect 
of the second respondent at his entrance into the fund 1 November 1987) 
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the terms and conditions of a pension fund organization should still contain such 
clauses (while a crass demonstration of the trustees’ dereliction of their fiduciary 
duties) is also cause for serious concern’  
The High Court failed to address this issue in its judgment which is perhaps no 
surprise considering its magnificent irrelevance to the facts at hand to say nothing of the 
fact that the policy document had been issued in 1987. The PF adjudicator’s suggestion 
therefore seems to be that the management board should have seen to it that the 
underwriter of member benefits amended the policy contracts with all members. Aside 
from the irrelevance of the issue, a policy contract is, in exchange for premiums, a 
promise to pay an amount at a future determinable date on the happening of an 
uncertain event. The object of such contracts is to provide for a myriad of future events, 
including those that may not exist at the time of contracting. There is theoretically no 
guarantee that the position of capital punishment as reflected in S v Makwenya may not 
change in years to come. 
8.3 Lawfulness: Failure to take into account relevant 
considerations 
As discussed at chapter 8.2. above, section 6(2)(e)(iii) provides for review of the 
administrator has failed to take account of relevant considerations. Certainly, the courts 
remain loathe to interfere with the administrator’s discretion to determine relevance but 
will do so when such factors are prescribed by stature or where the administrator has 
patently ignored relevant factors. The issue seems to have been resolved by the New 
Clicks judgment, discussed in chapter 4 above, albeit in the context of an administrator 
making subordinate legislation and not in an adjudicative or grievance tribunal. 
Chaskalson CJ confirmed that relevance goes to the lawfulness of the decision taken and 
that although the administrator is best positioned to consider relevance, the courts will 
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not ‘rubber stamp’ that decision274. Chaskalson CJ seems to be suggesting that the role 
of the courts is to consider the weight applied to the factors under consideration and the 
appropriateness or reasonableness of that weight, a position made the now famous 
Canadian Baker275 case.   
The PF adjudicator’s determination in the De Beer matter is an illustration of how this 
ground of review on the basis of relevance may be applied. The High Court found that 
the member’s own contribution rates contributed to the lower than expected retirement 
benefit and that this had not been taken into account by the PF adjudicator in his 
determination: 
‘The quantum of contributions is clearly a reason for a discrepancy between the final 
payout and the initial illustrative value. This point did not appear to have been 
adequately considered by first respondent as can be gleaned from the conclusion in 
his determination which follows upon an examination of the performance of the fund 
…Unfortunately, no mention is made in the determination, of the extent of the 
increases in contributions paid by second respondent or the further information 
regarding decreasing benefits provided by Sanlam Life to second respondent’276
8.4 Error of Law or Fact 
As Hoexter notes:  
‘Any legal system that tries to uphold a distinction between appeal and review is 
bound to experience some controversy regarding review for an error of law (or, 
indeed, one of fact). The rationale for the distinction is that it is not the court’s 
274 Supra at note142 
275 Supra at note22 and discussed by De Ville op cit at note25 footnote 715 at page 183 
276 Supra at page 18 
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function to say whether an administrator’s decision is right or wrong, but merely 
whether it was arrived at in an acceptable manner.’ [footnotes omitted]277
The traditional South African approach was to distinguish between jurisdictional and 
non-jurisdictional errors with non-jurisdictional errors not being reviewable as the 
administrator had acted within the empowering provisions. De Ville summarises the 
position as being that a review of administrative action was restricted to the legality of 
that action and, consequently, an error of fact or law could only be reviewed if the 
administrator had exceeded his/her powers or jurisdiction278.  In 1992, the distinction fell 
into disuse when the Appellate Division279 found that ‘the reviewability of an error of law 
depends on whether the legislature intended the tribunal to have exclusive authority to 
decide the question of law concerned.’280 The Court found that in adjudicative or 
grievance tribunals, it would be unlikely that the administrator held the sole authority to 
interpret the empowering statute and that the error must be of a material nature. 
The Hira requirement of materiality has been codified in PAJA281. As De Ville argues, 
it would be unfortunate if this provision of PAJA was interpreted to mean that all material 
errors of law were to be held to a correctness standard. He favours a contextual 
approach where the courts recognise that more than one ‘correct’ interpretation of a 
legislative provision is possible. He argues further that the courts should not be 
positioned as the final arbiters on statutory interpretation282. 
277 Hoexter, C op cit at note 67 at page 155 
278 De Ville, J op cit at note 25 at page 149 
279 Hira and Another v Booysens and Another (1992) (4) SA 69 A 
280 Op cit at note25 at page 155 
281 Section 6(2)(d) - the actions of an administrator may be reviewed if ‘the action was materially influenced 
by an error of law’ 
282 Op cit at note25 at pages 154 - 156  
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As to errors of fact, the test seems to be a rationality one where the decision may be 
set aside on the basis that there is a rational connection between the outcome of the 
decision, the facts on which the decision was based and the reasoning given for the 
decision283.  
The section 6 grounds of review provided for in PAJA do not explicitly specify that an 
administrator’s decision may be reviewable on the grounds of an error of fact. They do, 
however, provide for review in the case of non-compliance with a prescribed mandatory 
procedure or condition284. The section seems to provide for review if the administrator 
has erred on the facts but only is so far as they are required to be considered by the 
empowering statute. Certainly the administrator’s decision is reviewable if that decision 
or action is not rationally connected to ‘the information before the administrator’285 which 
seems to be a codification of the pre-PAJA common law position.  
In situations where the administrator is not enjoined by the empowering statute to 
consider certain factual evidence, the courts require the administrator to properly 
consider material evidence and to be able to justify the decision taken by reference to 
supporting evidence.  
With respect to the drafters of PAJA, it is unfortunate that the standard of review in 
respect of errors of law or fact is not clearly and explicitly stated. The use of a rationality 
standard in respect of the facts and the decision, a justifiability standard in respect of the 
reasons given as well as the suggestion of a correctness standard in respect of statutory 
interpretation does not make for certainty. De Ville has illuminated the matter by offering 
the following recommendation: 
283 Derby-Leweis and Another v Chairman of the Committee on Amnesty of the TRC and Others 2001 (3) SA 
1033 (C) As discussed by De Ville Op cit at note25 at page 161 
284 Section 6(2)(b) 
285 Section 6(2)(f)(ii)(cc) 
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 a correctness standard should be applied by the courts to determine whether 
the facts were correctly found 
 a reasonableness standard should be applied to determine whether the 
decision is rationally connected to the outcome 
 a rationality standard should be applied, when the administrator is acting 
under wide discretionary powers, to determine whether there is a rational 
basis for the decision with reference to the information before the 
administrator286.  
With respect to the illustrative case under discussion in this chapter, it is submitted 
that the PF adjudicator erred on the facts before him in respect of the legal relationship 
between the parties. The PF adjudicator addressed the nature of the contractual and 
legal relationships between the insurer (Sanlam Life Assurance Limited), the applicant 
(Central Retirement Annuity Fund) and the second respondent (De Beer). The rules of 
the CRA Fund provided for the payment of benefits to members at retirement, death, 
disability, etc. The rules also limited the fund’s liability to the values of the policies and 
investments held on behalf of a specific member287. The fund therefore underwrote its 
liabilities by means of insurance policies entered into between the Fund and Sanlam Life 
for the benefit of the member. 
The issue is relevant in respect of jurisdiction. If the PF adjudicator was unable to 
find liability on behalf of the Fund, and could do so only in respect of the underwriter, he 
would not have had jurisdiction to hear the dispute. The matter of competing and over-
lapping tribunals in the financial services industry is evidenced in the judgment of the 
High Court which found that the management board of the fund does hold duties as 
286 Op cit at note25 at page 170 
287 Supra at para 6 - 7 
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regards the policies effected on behalf of the members and therefore, the PF 
adjudicator’s jurisdiction was confirmed:  
‘In any event, applicant is a pension fund organization and has separate legal 
personality in terms of s51(a) of the Act. It cannot simply be treated as an illusionary 
“go between” [between] the members such as second respondent and Sanlam Life. It 
should be accountable to its members and hence subject to the discipline of the Act’s 
complaints mechanism’288  
and  
‘It follows that the reasonableness of the total charges levied by the insurers from 
time to time in respect of the administration of the fund and the apportionment 
thereof among beneficiaries are considerations, of which account must be taken by 
applicant’s management committee. Similarly, the reasonableness of investments 
effected and maintained by the insurer for the fund from time to time should be 
examined by the management committee, if the latter is to fulfil its fiduciary289 
responsibilities to member.’290  
Although finding that the management committee had not been derelict in this 
regard, the High Court confirmed that the management committee could not hand all 
liability to the insurer thereby excluding the jurisdiction of the PF adjudicator. 
The PF adjudicator’s path to the same end is found at paragraph 6 of the 
determination:  
288 Central Retirement Annuity Fund and PF Adjudicator of Pension Fund and Others Case Number 3404/05 
decided 20 October 2005 (C) at page 9 
289 On the point of “fiduciary duties” a reading of S7C and S7D of the Pension Fund Act 24 of 1956 will show 
that these are in fact statutory duties. The common law as regards fiduciaries may inform the interpretation 
of the statutory duties but it is submitted that the continued reference to fiduciary duties is misleading and 
inappropriate 
290 Supra at page 16 
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‘The language used in this document291 makes it clear that the parties thereto 
consider it to be an insurance policy “proposed” by the fund for the benefit of the 
complainant. I have already indicated that a retirement annuity fund (including the 
one here in issue) is not an insurance policy by a pension fund organisation. I thus 
consider that I can safely ignore the misleading form of this document (to the extent 
that it purports to be an insurance policy) and focus rather on its substance …’ 
[emphasis in original]. 
The position taken by the PF adjudicator is, with respect, astounding in its far 
reaching implications and its disregard of the regulatory regime within which retirement 
annuities function. As an example, in redefining the contractual relationship, the PF 
adjudicator is able to state that the benefits are payable by the fund per its own rules. 
The effect is that the Fund’s status as an audit exempt fund292 is amended. At page 4, 
the High Court also notes that the policy is effected in terms of section 34 of the 
Insurance Act of 1943293 which regulates, inter alia, the method of calculating 
contributions and benefits and for the supervisory role to be played by the Registrar for 
Long Term Insurance.  
It is submitted that the High Court’s approach is correct. To found liability for the 
management committee, the PF adjudicator disregarded or re-interpreted a policy 
contract. Conversely, the High Court recognised the separate legal personalities, the 
                                           
291 The policy contract between the Fund and the Insurer for the benefit of the member 
292 audit exempt fund as defined by Regulation 1 of Regulations issued under Government  Notice 
Regulations 98 of January 1962 and promulgated in terms of the Act.  The effect of this Regulation is that, in 
order to be exempted by the Registrar of Pension Funds from the provisions of section 9 and 15(1) (2) of the 
Act, the fund must comply with the following: 
(i). The assets must consist only of claims against one or more insurers; 
(ii) Every benefit in terms of the fund’s Rules must be paid solely by one or more insurers; 
(iii) Contributions to the fund must not be paid into a bank account of the fund but directly into one 
or more insurers. 
(iv) One insurer must accept responsibility to act as administering insurer. 
293 Now the Long Term Insurance Act 52 of 1998 
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contractual relationship between the parties and distinguished the various statutory 
duties, referred to as “fiduciary duties” in the judgment, of the parties. 
9 The Path to better Decision-making 
Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of PAJA require that aggrieved parties exhaust any internal 
remedies prior to seeking redress via judicial review. The legislative framework within 
which administrative tribunals can function is to be welcomed. It has been argued in the 
preceding chapters however that the ‘haphazard fashion’294 in which specialist tribunals 
in the financial services industry have developed in South Africa has meant that the 
opportunity presented by PAJA in respect of alternative paths to administrative justice 
cannot be fully explored. 
The De Beer case is illustrative of the need for a consistent standard of review 
across tribunals operating within the same industry. In legislating in favour of an appeal 
process and not a review, either on the basis of reasonability or rationality, the 
legislature has failed to recognise the expertise of industry specific tribunals and, 
therefore, the need for deference by the judiciary. If the Canadian approach295 is to be 
followed, a reasonableness standard would best be reserved for reviews involving 
fundamental rights and it may therefore be more appropriate for a rationality standard to 
be applied to grievance procedures where financial interests and not fundamental rights 
are impacted. One of the challenges to modern participative democracy is the path to 
managing or controlling the use of public power while retaining the separation of powers 
between branches of government. An analysis of the PF adjudicator’s determination and 
the High Court judgment in the De Beer case would indicate that this path has not yet 
been found.  
294 Creyke, R op cit note 209 
295 As discussed by Mullan op cit note 23 
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The appeal process provides no incentive towards better decision making by the 
administrative decision maker, it demonstrates no deference to the expertise of that 
decision maker nor does it assure future participants in a grievance procedure of the 
integrity or finality of the process. Certainly, the PF adjudicator’s determination can be 
roundly criticised but it is submitted that a review on the basis of lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair administrative justice as determined by the Constitution Court in the 
New Clicks judgment would have achieved the same ends and would have cemented 
deference to the specialist grievance tribunal.  
Deference is required not because the common law courts are unable or ill-suited to 
hear appeals from grievance tribunals but because courts should recognise the role that 
administrative agencies and tribunals play within government and within the regulatory 
structure. This deference to the experience and the expertise of administrative decision 
makers is not however without limits however. As found by the Court in Bato Star:  
‘[t]his does not mean … that where the decision is one which will not reasonably 
result in the achievement of the goal, or which is not reasonably supported on the 
facts or not reasonable in the light of the reasons given for it, a court may not review 
that decision.’296  
Open, accountable and transparent government rests partly on an efficient and 
trusted administration and this must be seen to include grievance tribunals established 
with the purpose of providing more immediate, cost efficient and expert solutions that 
are alive to the policy considerations of government. In respect of the financial services 
industry, government policy is to encourage personal wealth protection within a macro-
economic model that is not able to provide adequate social assistance and this requires a 
well regulated, efficient industry that is committed to consumer protection, education 
and empowerment. It is argued that this laudable aim is not easily achievable without a 
296 Supra at note 4 at para 48  
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coherent and symbiotic tribunal structure, with distinct jurisdictions, an internal appeal 
opportunity and ultimately judicial review on the basis of reasonableness. Finally, as the 
Constitutional Court said in New Clicks: ‘The important of ensuring that the 
administration observes fundamental rights and acts both ethically and accountably 
should not be understated.’297
297 Supra at note 5 at para 588 
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